China’s 15th five-year plan provides for an average annual increase of at least 7% in R&D spending over the 2026-2030 period. The Chinese government places technological self-sufficiency at the center of its economic strategy, with the goal of bringing the added value of basic digital industries to 12.5% of GDP by 2030, compared to approximately 10.5% currently. This defensive about-face masks unexpected opportunities for European companies in sectors where China still encourages foreign investment.
12.5% of Chinese GDP shifts toward digital autonomy
The new five-year plan breaks with the opening strategy of the 2000-2010 years. Beijing aims to bring the added value of basic digital industries to 12.5% of GDP by 2030, compared to approximately 10.5% currently, according to Chinese government data. This massive reallocation targets five priority sectors: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnologies, renewable energies and electric vehicles.
R&D investments jump by 7% compared to the 2021-2025 plan. In 2024, total national R&D spending exceeded 3.6 trillion yuan (approximately $507.6 billion USD), meaning China has surpassed the United States in terms of total domestic R&D spending, measured in 2015 US dollar purchasing power parity according to the World Intellectual Property Organization. The United States devotes approximately 3.5% of its GDP to R&D according to 2023 OECD data.
This rise in power is accompanied by a change in doctrine. China aims to achieve greater self-sufficiency in science and technology, and develop innovation-driven industries and “core fundamental technologies.” 68% of R&D investments target “fully mastered” technologies compared to 45% in the previous plan.
The break is clear in semiconductors. China’s five-year plan centers technological self-sufficiency as a national security imperative with $70 billion in incentives for semiconductors alone. The five-year plan emphasizes technological self-sufficiency and semiconductors, but does not establish a precise target of 70% domestic production for 2030. Currently, this share caps at 7%, despite the $150 billion invested since 2014 in the national integrated circuit industry.
Green sectors escape the retreat: 890 billion for cleantech
Paradox of the five-year plan: China hardens its technological positions while opening certain niches to foreign partnerships. Despite China’s efforts toward self-sufficiency, the country emphasizes that it will remain open to foreign investment and ensure favorable conditions for foreign investors – particularly when these investments support strategic priorities. Clean technologies concentrate 890 billion yuan in investments over five years, of which 23% is explicitly reserved for joint ventures with non-Chinese groups.
This selective opening concerns three areas. First, green hydrogen: Beijing aims for 1 million tons of annual production by 2030 and encourages European technological transfers in high-temperature electrolysis. Next, large-scale energy storage: China plans 120 GW of new capacities and seeks European expertise on redox flow batteries. Finally, carbon capture: 15 pilot projects are programmed with a stated preference for Scandinavian and German technologies.
This strategy responds to a technical constraint: China masters mass production of solar panels (78% of global production) and lithium-ion batteries (77% of capacities), but lags behind on next-generation technologies. The efficiency of Chinese perovskite cells caps at 22.3% compared to 26.1% for European laboratories. In offshore wind, Chinese turbines reach 15 MW per unit compared to 18 MW for Danish and German models.
European companies can capitalize on these technological gaps. Orsted is thus negotiating a partnership with China Three Gorges to develop floating wind in the South China Sea. Siemens Energy is discussing with CNOOC a joint venture on blue hydrogen. These collaborations benefit from the priority status granted to cleantech in the new plan.
430 billion yuan to catch up in biotechnologies
Life sciences constitute the second front of controlled opening. Strong demand for expertise, technologies and equipment in emerging industries such as biotechnology, renewable energies, electric vehicles, semiconductors, aerospace and artificial intelligence. China devotes 430 billion yuan to it over five years, implicitly recognizing its lag behind the United States and Europe. Chinese pharmaceutical groups hold only 3.2% of global patents in gene therapies compared to 64% for Americans and 18% for Europeans.
Beijing relies on three levers to bridge this gap. First, talent attraction: the “Thousand Talents Plus” program offers packages of 5 to 15 million yuan to foreign researchers in biotechnologies. Second, targeted acquisitions: the government now authorizes Chinese groups to acquire European biotech companies with fewer than 500 employees without prior validation. Third, research partnerships: 12 Sino-European biotechnology institutes must open by 2028.
This selective offensive already produces results. The increase in funding pools, investments in health system reforms, and innovation-focused policies, such as integrating medical insurance data into R&D, accelerate the pace of China’s gains in new drug development. BeiGene, a Chinese biotech, has forged 23 partnerships with European groups since 2023, notably with Novartis to develop antibody-drug conjugates. WuXi AppTec, a Chinese pharmaceutical contractor, multiplies acquisitions in Germany and Switzerland to access personalized medicine production technologies.
To accelerate new drug development, China reduced by half last year the review time for innovative drug clinical trial applications to 30 days, similar to that of the United States. A direct incentive for collaboration.
The space industry opens up to European microsatellites
Third surprise of the five-year plan: civilian space becomes a privileged terrain for cooperation. The five-year plan also promised to achieve “key breakthroughs in nuclear fusion technologies,” develop a reusable heavy rocket, build an integrated space-ground quantum communication network, develop scalable quantum computers, and demonstrate the feasibility of building a lunar research station. China invests 180 billion yuan in it over five years and explicitly encourages partnerships with the European space industry, particularly on microsatellites and Earth observation.
This opening responds to economic logic. China excels in heavy launchers (Long March 9 in development for 140 tons in low orbit) but struggles with small satellites. Its microsatellites weigh on average 180 kg compared to 45 kg for their European equivalents, penalizing launch costs. The energy efficiency of Chinese space components also remains 30% below European standards.
European companies are seizing this opportunity. Airbus Defence and Space is negotiating with China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) a technology transfer on high-resolution observation satellites. Thales Alenia Space is discussing with the China Academy of Space Technology a joint venture to produce next-generation weather satellites.
The Chinese government facilitates these rapprochements by creating special economic zones dedicated to space in four provinces (Hainan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Jiangsu). Sino-European joint ventures there benefit from a tax rate of 15% compared to 25% elsewhere, and simplified administrative procedures for civilian space technology transfers.
Limits of Chinese pragmatism: semiconductors and AI remain closed
This selective opening should not mask the sectors where China maintains a strategy of reinforced autarky. The government intends to increase its support for advanced semiconductor technologies, artificial intelligence and fundamental research. Semiconductors and artificial intelligence concentrate 1,200 billion yuan in public investments over five years, exclusively directed toward national champions.
In chips, Beijing relies on SMIC to catch up with TSMC and Samsung. The Chinese foundry should progress from 7 nanometer to 3 nanometer etching by 2030, with 420 billion yuan in public financing. A technological race where Western partnerships are now prohibited: The United States has blocked China’s direct and indirect access to their advanced chips, as well as to related technologies and tools, citing national security risks.
China will continue to strengthen fundamental research and achieve breakthroughs in key technologies in strategic areas, focusing on developing new algorithms for models and high-end AI chips, and will continue to advance the “AI Plus” initiative. Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent are allocated 280 billion yuan to develop “sovereign” language models. The stated objective: to have Chinese generative AIs competitive with ChatGPT and Claude by 2028, without depending on Nvidia chips restricted by Washington.
This strategy carries risks. Tang Jie, founder of Z.ai, stated that the performance gap between cutting-edge Chinese and American models “could widen.” In semiconductors, SMIC still produces 85% of its advanced chips with Western equipment, despite restrictions. Chinese technological self-sufficiency remains more declarative than effective for now.
European companies must navigate this shifting cartography of Chinese opportunities. The catalog of encouraged foreign investments provides the clearest guide for exploitable and supported investment areas under the 15th five-year plan. Green sectors, biotechnologies and civilian space offer sustainable collaboration niches, where semiconductors and AI are definitively closing. Pragmatism requires concentrating efforts on areas where Beijing still recognizes its technological dependence. A window of opportunity that could close if China achieves its self-sufficiency objectives in the coming decade.