Several billion dollars. That is the trading profit generated by BP, Shell and TotalEnergies in the first quarter of 2026, while their American rivals posted losses. BP achieved $3.84 billion in profits and TotalEnergies $5.8 billion, while ExxonMobil and Chevron saw their profits fall by 45% and 36%. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since February transformed the energy market into a giant casino — and the Europeans master the rules of the game better.
This divergence exposes forty years of opposing strategies between the two sides of the Atlantic. While American majors bet on crude oil production, their European counterparts developed trading capacities that make them today masters of global energy flows.
The Essential Points
- BP, Shell and TotalEnergies posted exceptional profits thanks to high prices and reinforced trading contributions
- ExxonMobil and Chevron suffered from unfavorable timing effects on derivatives markets
- The closure of the Strait of Hormuz amplifies price volatility and favors trading models
- European majors control a significant share of global floating storage capacity
BP Triples Trading Revenue Since Hormuz Crisis
BP generated $3.2 billion in underlying profits in the first quarter, compared to $1.5 billion in the previous quarter, thanks to exceptional contribution from oil trading and reinforced midstream performance. Shell and TotalEnergies also achieved substantial performance. These results illustrate European capacity to transform volatility into profits.
The strategy rests on infrastructure developed since the 1980s. BP owns a fleet of 280 tanker vessels, Shell controls less than 2% of global refining capacity, TotalEnergies operates in 42 producing countries. These networks enable arbitrage between prices according to geographies and delivery timeframes.
Bernard Looney, BP’s CEO, summarizes the approach: “We don’t just sell oil, we sell energy flexibility.” This flexibility is worth gold when the Persian Gulf closes and tankers circumnavigate Africa to reach Europe and Asia.
Americans Struggle to Monetize Domestic Production
ExxonMobil suffered approximately $3.9 billion in unfavorable timing effects on derivatives in the first quarter, reflecting the discrepancy between the valuation of financial instruments and associated physical transactions, while Chevron recorded a loss of $817 million in its refining operations due to timing effects on financial hedges. Their business models prioritize extraction in the United States and direct sales to established customers — an approach profitable in normal times, ineffective during disruption periods.
American majors extract 4.2 million barrels per day in the United States, compared to 1.8 million for their European rivals. But this domestic production becomes a handicap when prices explode elsewhere. ExxonMobil sells its Texan oil to American refineries at the local price, while BP buys Russian crude at reduced rates to resell it in India with a 40% margin.
The gap widens on logistical capacities. Europeans own a significant share of global floating storage capacity — those vessels that serve as mobile warehouses. When prices rise, they store. When prices fall, they sell. A flexibility that Americans have not developed.
European Trading Rests on Forty Years of Investment in Networks
This European superiority does not date from the Hormuz crisis. It results from a conscious strategy initiated in the 1980s, when European majors diversified their activities facing oil nationalizations in the Middle East.
Shell has invested $45 billion in its trading infrastructure since 1985. The Dutch company operates 47 oil terminals, 25 distribution centers and maintains supply contracts with 73 countries. BP spent $38 billion toward the same objective, TotalEnergies $29 billion.
These investments create “energy highways” between production and consumption basins. Europe finally unlocks its single market by tackling the ten worst barriers weighing down its growth, facilitating these cross-border flows.
European traders operate from London, Rotterdam and Geneva with teams of 800 to 1,200 people. They trade continuously on physical and derivatives markets, arbitrage between crude qualities, optimize transport routes. An expertise that Americans did not deem necessary to develop.
Energy Geopolitics Shifts Toward Flows Rather Than Stocks
The Hormuz crisis accelerates a profound transformation of the oil industry. Possession of reserves matters less than the capacity to circulate hydrocarbons. Saudi Arabia produces 11 million barrels per day but depends on European traders to sell its production to Asia.
This evolution upsets geopolitical balances. The United States exports 4 million barrels per day but remains vulnerable to supply disruptions due to insufficient strategic storage capacities. Russia sells its oil via Shell and BP networks despite sanctions, demonstrating the porosity of embargoes against sophisticated commercial flows.
Artificial intelligence amplifies these trends. Trading algorithms analyze in real time satellite data, vessel movements, climate variations to anticipate prices. AI transforms disinformation into an industry driven by state manipulation, but it also revolutionizes the predictive capacity of energy traders.
American Majors Attempt to Catch Up on Logistics
ExxonMobil announced in March 2026 an investment of $12 billion to develop its trading capacities. The Texas company plans to acquire 35 tanker vessels and build 8 storage terminals by 2028.
Chevron adopts a different strategy by forging partnerships with independent traders. The agreement signed with Vitol in February provides for joint marketing of 500,000 barrels per day on Asian markets. ConocoPhillips develops its own capacities by recruiting 150 experienced traders from European majors.
These initiatives remain insufficient against European advantage. Trading infrastructure requires decades to reach operational maturity. Shell’s networks extend across six continents with 15,000 referenced suppliers — an ecosystem that ExxonMobil cannot replicate in three years.
Cultural difference also plays a role. European trading teams integrate financial, geopolitical and logistical profiles. Their American counterparts prioritize petroleum engineers and geologists, less suited to the sophistications of modern trading.
Europe Transforms Energy Crisis Into Sustained Competitive Advantage
First quarter 2026 performances do not constitute a cyclical accident. They reveal a structural transformation of the global energy market where mastery of flows trumps possession of resources.
This evolution redefines petroleum value chains. Margins migrate from extraction to commercialization, from wells to ports, from geology to commercial geography. A transition that favors European models developed over forty years.
Energy volatility, amplified by geopolitical tensions, becomes permanent. European trading capacities, designed to navigate uncertainty, transform this instability into a source of recurrent profits. A competitive advantage that will endure beyond the resolution of the Hormuz conflict.