5.3 billion dollars squandered in four years, 600 million in annual losses, and finally a quiet withdrawal: Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund is abandoning LIV Golf by the end of 2026. This financial capitulation raises questions about the real effectiveness of sportswashing as a geopolitical tool.
Saudi Arabia has just demonstrated that even its sovereign wealth funds have limits. After transforming professional golf with millions of dollars, Riyadh is brutally cutting funding for LIV Golf, forcing the breakaway league to urgently seek new private investors for 2027.
600 Million in Annual Losses Exhaust Even Riyadh
LIV Golf’s financial record resembles an outright shipwreck. Between 2022 and 2026, the Public Investment Fund injected 5.3 billion dollars into the venture—more than Montenegro’s entire GDP. Annual losses fluctuate between 500 and 600 million dollars, primarily due to pharaonic fees paid to players defecting from the PGA Tour.
Phil Mickelson received 200 million dollars to join LIV, Dustin Johnson 125 million, Brooks Koepka 100 million. These amounts far exceed the prize money winnings from entire careers on the traditional circuit. Cameron Smith, winner of the 2022 Open Championship, negotiated 140 million to leave the PGA Tour.
The strategy of relentless acquisition collided with an implacable reality: television and advertising revenues never took off. Unlike the English Premier League, which now generates 6 billion euros per season after injections of foreign capital, LIV Golf struggles to exceed 200 million in annual revenues according to SportBusiness Journal estimates.
This financial hemorrhage occurs as Saudi Arabia faces new budgetary constraints. Saudi Arabia’s public deficit reached 79 billion dollars in 2024, representing 8.7% of GDP, according to the Ministry of Finance. Military spending related to tensions with Iran now accounts for 11% of GDP, compared to 7% in 2020.
The New 2026-2030 Strategy Removes Sport from Priorities
The Public Investment Fund validated a radical strategic overhaul in late 2024 that marks the death knell of large-scale sportswashing. The six priority ecosystems selected for 2026-2030 are renewable energy, technology, financial services, food and agriculture, healthcare, and tourism. Sport has completely disappeared from this list.
Even more significant: the share of capital deployed internationally drops from 70% to 20%. This pivot toward domestic investment responds to the imperatives of Vision 2030, the kingdom’s economic diversification plan. With a target of creating 2.5 million jobs by 2030, Saudi Arabia now prioritizes projects that generate local activity.
NEOM, the futuristic megacity under construction in the desert, alone absorbs 120 billion dollars in investment over the period. The Line, the 170-kilometer linear city, mobilizes 1,500 billion riyals (400 billion dollars). These pharaonic projects leave little room for expensive sporting ventures.
Mohammed bin Salman explicitly confirmed this shift during the Future Investment Initiative in October 2024: “We are now investing 80% of our resources within the kingdom. The era of indiscriminate acquisitions abroad is over.” This declaration definitively buries the age of unlimited checkbooks.
Sportswashing Paradoxically Succeeded Before Being Abandoned
The irony of the situation lies in this troubling observation: LIV Golf largely achieved its reputational objectives before being sacrificed on the altar of budget constraints. In four years, the breakaway league established itself as a credible alternative to the PGA Tour, thus normalizing Saudi Arabia’s presence in world golf.
Sports media now treat LIV Golf as an ordinary circuit, its geopolitical origins erased from commentary. ESPN broadcasts tournaments without systematic mention of Saudi financing. Golf Digest classifies LIV players in its world rankings. Sky Sports covers events with the same journalistic neutrality as traditional tournaments.
This normalization is precisely the objective of sportswashing: transforming an operation of influence into an accomplished sporting fact. Saudi Arabia succeeded in permanently dividing professional golf, creating lasting competition to the American monopoly of the PGA Tour. Even without future Saudi financing, LIV Golf will continue to exist thanks to American and European private capital already committed.
The legitimizing effect persists beyond the initial investment. Newcastle United, purchased by the PIF in 2021 for 305 million pounds, continues to carry Saudi colors in the Premier League without systematically raising controversy. English fans now support “their” team without geopolitical questioning.
Limited Effectiveness Reveals the Weaknesses of Sports as a Weapon
This abrupt withdrawal nevertheless reveals the structural limitations of sportswashing as a geopolitical instrument. Unlike industrial investments that generate measurable returns, sports remain a financial black hole justified only by reputational benefits difficult to quantify.
Saudi Arabia is discovering that purchased influence does not survive serious budgetary constraints. With rising tensions facing Iran and intervention costs in Yemen, Riyadh must arbitrate between soft power and hard power. The choice is made: defense takes priority over reputation.
This vulnerability contrasts with Chinese influence, which relies on durable infrastructure rather than notable acquisitions. China builds ports, roads, and power plants that generate revenue while ensuring its influence. The Saudi approach, purely consumptive, proves unsustainable in the face of geopolitical realities.
Qatar, confronted with the same dilemma, has already begun its own rationalization. After the 2022 World Cup, Doha is reducing its European sporting investments to focus on its gas development. Paris Saint-Germain itself is subject to strategic review, according to L’Équipe.
Durable Investments Resist Better Than Spectacle
Analysis of other Saudi investments reveals a clear hierarchy of priorities. Aramco maintains its stakes in European and Asian refineries, generating regular revenue. SABIC continues its global petrochemical expansion. Saudi National Bank strengthens its positions in regional financial services.
These industrial and financial investments survive budgetary restrictions because they directly contribute to the kingdom’s economic objectives. They diversify revenue sources, create synergies with the domestic economy, and strengthen Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic position.
The contrast with LIV Golf is striking. The golf league generates no technology transfer, creates no jobs in Saudi Arabia, and strengthens no local economic sectors. Its sole justification lay in image, an asset judged too fragile against the imperatives of national defense.
This rationalization is also observed in Formula 1. If Saudi Arabia maintains its Jeddah Grand Prix, it is because the event integrates into the Vision 2030 tourism strategy. Direct economic returns justify the investment, unlike American professional golf.
Toward Post-Sportswashing Geopolitics
Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal from LIV Golf may mark the end of an era: that of sportswashing by proxy, where petromonarchies bought entire leagues to rehabilitate their image. The future probably belongs to hybrid investments, combining influence and profitability.
Saudi Arabia is already testing this approach with its candidacy for the 2029 Winter Olympics, centered on NEOM. The sporting event becomes a pretext for territorial development rather than pure purchase of influence. Olympic infrastructure will subsequently serve mass tourism, creating a sustainable economic model.
This evolution reflects growing geopolitical maturity. Rather than imitating Western powers through cultural soft power, Saudi Arabia now assumes its regional specificity. It invests in what it masters: energy, petrochemistry, and logistics between Asia and Europe.
LIV Golf will ultimately have served as an expensive laboratory, demonstrating that money alone is insufficient to create lasting influence. For sportswashing to work long-term, it must anchor itself in a coherent economic strategy. Otherwise, it remains a geopolitical luxury that even the richest sovereign wealth funds cannot afford indefinitely.
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