It took roughly as many years of income to buy a home in 1965 as it did in 2000. For thirty-five years, prices followed incomes, as if there were some physical law at work [1]. Then, starting in 2002, that ceiling gave way. Prices broke from that trajectory, shot upward, then stabilized at a level roughly 70% higher than what incomes would have justified [2].
Seventy percent higher. Even now, despite the decline of 2023-2024, prices remain 55% above their long-term trend [2]. This is an entrenched regime shift. And what it concretely produces is a gradual closing off of homeownership based on income.
Homeownership sorted itself by income, and the sorting got harsher
Between 1984 and 2013, income became the primary determinant of homeownership status [5]. In 1984, with equal characteristics, the chances of being a homeowner ranged from 39.4% for the lowest-income households to 68.6% for the most affluent. By 2013, the bottom of the scale had fallen to just 33%, against 84.9% at the top [5]. The gap between the bottom and top of the income distribution widened from 29 percentage points to 52 percentage points over thirty years. A door that swung shut, not one that closed gradually.
The mechanism is easy to understand. Falling interest rates and longer loan terms cushioned the impact of rising prices on monthly payments. Household debt increased continuously [4]. This mechanism benefited those who could borrow. Others, whose incomes didn’t pass banking filters, were pushed out of the market.
The average age of first-time buyers increased by roughly ten years over twenty years [2]. Buyers gradually concentrated among the highest incomes and older age groups.
When interest rates rose after 2022, the situation deteriorated further for middle-income households. In the third quarter of 2023, a first-time buyer had to take on a 29-year mortgage to purchase the same home that required only 15 years of payments in 1965 or 2000 [4]. Nearly twice as long. Over the past twenty-five years, prices have more than doubled, while disposable household income has not kept pace [9]. Purchasing a home now requires either a substantial down payment—in other words, an inheritance—or a high income.
France is not an exception, but its position is particular. The OECD index measuring the ratio between housing prices and incomes reached around 106 in 2024-2025, with 2015 as the base of 100, after peaking at 126 in 2022 [7]. The recent relief does not offset twenty years of drift. The ratio remains structurally above its pre-2002 level. OECD data show that each generation is less likely than the previous one to own their home at the same age [7].
What public assistance has made worse
France spends massively on housing. Subsidies totaled 43.1 billion euros in 2024, down 1.1% [12]. A significant portion of that money has supported demand without acting on supply.
Personal housing allowances alone represented 15.9 billion euros [12]. The problem: supporting demand on a market with constrained supply amounts to financing price increases. Sellers and landlords capture the subsidy.
The causal chain is documented. Over the period 1988-1996, housing aid per square meter granted to the most modest households had increased by 15.8 euros more than that granted to households slightly above them. Result: one additional euro of aid led to a rent increase of 0.94 euros [19]. Nearly all of the aid was captured by price. Compensating for a price that is too high with aid amounts to maintaining that inflated price.
The pressure tightens precisely where it matters most. The share of income absorbed by housing is increasing only for the most modest households, up 1.1 percentage points to 32.1% [6]. Housing aid for these households has fallen, dropping from nearly 10% of their income in 2014 to 6.9% in 2024 [6].
Real estate taxation aggravates the effect. The cadastral rental values that serve as the basis for property tax represent the theoretical annual rent at 1970 market conditions. This base has not undergone a comprehensive revision in over fifty years [14]. The practical consequence: property tax undervalues older buildings and overvalues new construction.
In Paris, property tax is structurally lower than in departments like Seine-Saint-Denis, which have more recent construction [13]. The most favorably located land holdings, thus the most expensive, are taxed least. Tax policy thus favors the holding and appreciation of existing land and taxes more heavily the construction intended for households seeking to buy.
Removing public land from speculative circulation
The choice that 2027 must make is this: continue supporting households buying on a speculative market, or change who owns the land. The distinction is radical, and the long-term public cost runs in opposite directions.
One tool exists and remains underdeployed. The solidarity land lease (bail réel solidaire, or BRS) relies on a solidarity land institution—a nonprofit organization—that retains ownership of the land while a household purchases the home built on it at a reduced price of 20 to 40% depending on location [15]. By removing the cost of land from the acquisition equation, the mechanism makes buying accessible to households who would otherwise be excluded. Price resale caps are written into law: the home cannot shift into speculative circulation upon resale [15].
This model changes the market architecture in one decisive way. Land no longer belongs to individual sellers or investors. It belongs to an institution that removes it from the market permanently. Land lease payments made by households refinance the acquisition of new land [15]. The cost of housing policy can thus decrease over time, rather than growing at the pace of prices.
The real budgetary constraint is this: the 43.1 billion euros in housing subsidies in 2024 finance flows—rents and interest—without creating permanent assets [12]. Shifting some of that effort toward solidarity land institutions builds a collective asset that reproduces itself. Klein and Thompson, in Abundance (2025), show that liberal democracies have constructed scarcities by spending billions to support demand for goods whose supply is deliberately choked off [20]. Separating land from building breaks that cycle instead of financing it.
Making this architecture mandatory for all public land transferred or developed with public support—by the state, local authorities, public land institutions—changes the nature of housing policy. Today, public land transfers occur at market price or with a one-time reduction, without duration conditions [17]. After this shift, all newly available public land would enter the permanent portfolio of solidarity land institutions. The price of affordable housing ceases to be indexed to land speculation. And once land enters a solidarity land institution, it does not leave.
Sources
[1] IGEDD (J. Friggit), “The Price of Residential Real Estate Over the Long Term,” September 2026, https://www.igedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/prix-immobilier-evolution-a-long-terme-a1048.html (accessed 29/09/2026).
[2] IGEDD (J. Friggit), “Rents, Housing Prices and Income per Household Since the 1960s,” hearing before the Senate information mission on the housing crisis, January 2024, https://www.igedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/prix-immobilier-friggit-senat-2024_cle568311.pdf (accessed 29/09/2026).
[3] IGEDD, “Why Have Housing Prices Nearly Doubled Relative to Household Income Since 2000?,” FAQ, January 2023, https://www.igedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/pourquoi-le-prix-des-logements-a-t-il-presque-a3667.html (accessed 29/09/2026).
[4] IGEDD, “Friggit’s Tunnel and Friggit’s Curve: What Are They?,” https://www.igedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/tunnel-de-friggit-et-courbe-de-friggit-qu-est-ce-a3578.html (accessed 29/09/2026).
[5] INSEE, “Housing Conditions in France,” 2017 Edition, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/fichier/2586377/LOGFRA17.pdf (accessed 29/09/2026).
[6] INSEE, “Housing Weighs Less on Household Budgets in 2024 Than It Did Ten Years Ago, Except for the Most Modest,” INSEE Première No. 2128, 2025, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/9053584 (accessed 29/09/2026).
[7] OECD, “Housing Prices: Price-to-Income Ratio,” OECD Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/housing-prices.html (accessed 29/09/2026).
[8] OECD, “Real Estate Taxation in OECD Countries,” 2022, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/fr/topics/policy-issues/politique-fiscale/brochure-la-fiscalite-immobiliere-dans-les-pays-de-l-ocde.pdf (accessed 29/09/2026).
[9] Senate, Information Mission on the Housing Crisis, 2024 Report, https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/parlementaire/crise-du-logement-le-senat-tire-la-sonnette-d-alarme-et-appelle-a-une-loi-de-programmation (accessed 29/09/2026).
[10] National Assembly, Information Mission on Inadequate Housing, hearing record 2023-2024, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/micplog/l16micplog2324018_compte-rendu.pdf (accessed 29/09/2026).
[11] DREES, “Thirty Years of Evolution in Household Housing Spending,” DSS Working Paper, 2020, https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-10/dss55.pdf (accessed 29/09/2026).
[12] SDES/CGDD, “Housing Account 2024,” summary relayed by Monimmeuble.com, December 2025, https://monimmeuble.com/actualite/compte-du-logement-2024-619-mde-de-depenses-en-france (accessed 29/09/2026).
[13] Court of Accounts, report on real estate property taxation, cited by FIPECO, 2022, https://www.fipeco.fr/commentaire/La%20fiscalit%C3%A9%20du%20patrimoine%20immobilier (accessed 29/09/2026).
[14] DGFiP/FIPECO, “How to Revise Cadastral Values?,” https://www.fipeco.fr/fiche/Comment-r%C3%A9viser-les-valeurs-cadastrales-%3F (accessed 29/09/2026).
[15] CEREMA, “The Solidarity Land Lease (BRS),” outil2amenagement.cerema.fr, https://outil2amenagement.cerema.fr/outils/bail-reel-solidaire-brs (accessed 29/09/2026).
[16] INSEE, “Average Living Standard by Income Bracket,” Fiscal and Social Income Survey 2024, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2417897 (accessed 29/09/2026).
[17] Olivier Lluansi, hearing before the special commission charged with examining the bill on reindustrialization, National Assembly, 2024-2025, https://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/comptes-rendus/cereind/l17cereind2425004_compte-rendu.pdf (accessed 29/09/2026).
[18] Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, Abundance, Avid Reader Press/Simon & Schuster, March 2025.
[19] Céline Grislain-Letrémy and Corentin Trevien, “The Impact of Housing Aid on the Private Rental Sector,” Économie et Statistique, INSEE, 2014, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1377833 (accessed 29/09/2026).
[20] Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, Abundance, Avid Reader Press/Simon & Schuster, March 2025.



