In 2025, tropical regions lost 4.3 million hectares of primary forest — equivalent to Denmark’s total land area. But in Brazil, primary deforestation excluding fires dropped 41% compared to 2024, reaching its lowest level ever recorded.
This victory reveals a dilemma of the global energy transition. While the Amazon breathes under the political pressure of Lula, Indonesia destroys its forests to extract nickel for European and Chinese electric vehicle batteries. Forest protection hasn’t disappeared — it has shifted toward countries that supply the critical metals of decarbonization.
The Essentials
- Brazil reduces primary deforestation by 41% in one year, reaching a historic preservation record
- Indonesia remains under pressure due to nickel extraction for global electric vehicle batteries
- Colombia also shows a 17% decline in forest loss
- Europe and China massively import Indonesian nickel for their electric vehicles
- This geography reveals the contradictions of the global energy transition
Brazil Demonstrates That Reversing Deforestation Is Possible in Two Years
Lula da Silva had promised to achieve zero deforestation by 2030. Two years after his return to power, the results exceed expectations. According to Global Forest Watch, primary forest loss in Brazil excluding natural fires has reached its lowest level since satellite measurements began.
This drop is explained by a combination of repressive and incentive measures. The Brazilian government strengthened controls in national parks, multiplied fines for illegal logging, and relaunched rural credit programs conditional on forest preservation. The National Institute for Space Research (INPE) reports that areas cleared for cattle ranching declined by 60% in the state of Pará, the main historical center of deforestation.
Colombia is following a similar trajectory with a 17% reduction in primary deforestation. President Gustavo Petro suspended new forest exploitation permits and increased natural park budgets by 40% in two years. These South American results prove that a state can reverse forest destruction without waiting for long-term economic transformation.
The contrast with the Bolsonaro administration is striking. Between 2019 and 2022, Brazil had lost an average of approximately 1.6 million hectares of primary forest per year. In 2025, this figure drops to 1.63 million hectares according to Global Forest Watch. These actual data show that although deforestation remains concerning, deliberate public policies produce measurable results.
Indonesia Becomes the Forest Blind Spot of the Energy Transition
While the Amazon rebuilds itself, Indonesia continues to experience significant pressure on its forests, losing approximately 300,000 to 434,000 hectares of primary forest in 2025 according to Global Forest Watch. This deforestation responds to a new global demand: the extraction of nickel for batteries in European and Chinese electric vehicles.
Indonesia holds 20% of global nickel reserves, a metal essential to lithium-ion batteries. The archipelago extracted 1.8 million tons of nickel in 2025, a 25% increase compared to the previous year. This production primarily feeds Chinese battery factories CATL and BYD, as well as European automakers decarbonizing.
Indonesian nickel mines extend primarily on the island of Sulawesi, where tropical forests retreat under the pressure of open-pit operations. Each ton of nickel extracted destroys an average of 15 hectares of forest according to NGO Walhi Indonesia. Local communities lose their agricultural land to industrial installations financed by Chinese and European capital.
This dynamic reveals a contradiction in global decarbonization. The EU makes compliance its new commercial frontier to protect its industries, but massively imports metals extracted at the price of forest destruction elsewhere. The European energy transition externalizes its environmental costs to Indonesia.
China Concentrates 70% of Global Indonesian Nickel Refining
China transforms 70% of raw Indonesian nickel into electric vehicle batteries destined for the global market. This geographic concentration gives Beijing regulatory power over the entire value chain of Western electric vehicles.
Chinese group Tsingshan, the world’s largest nickel producer, directly controls 40% of Indonesian production through its local subsidiaries. This vertical integration allows China to set refined nickel prices and condition European supplies to its own geopolitical objectives.
Europe is attempting to diversify its supply sources, but remains dependent on the China-Indonesia duo for 85% of its refined nickel needs. Attempts at European relocation face the energy costs of refining and the absence of significant reserves on the continent. Finland and France exploit marginal deposits that cover less than 5% of continental consumption.
This dependence creates a strategic dilemma for European energy autonomy. Decarbonizing European transport requires importing metals extracted under environmental conditions that Europe refuses on its own territory. The energy transition thus reveals its own geopolitical contradictions.
Environmental Standards Fragment According to Extraction Geographies
Global forest protection now follows a two-speed geography. Developed countries preserve their forests while extractive countries sacrifice theirs to fuel global decarbonization.
Canada and the United States have reduced deforestation by an average of 15% since 2020, primarily through regulations on forest exploitation and reforestation programs financed by carbon credits. Europe maintains stable forest coverage over the past decade, with even a net progression of 0.2% per year according to the FAO.
Conversely, countries producing critical metals face increasing pressure on their forest ecosystems. Beyond Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo loses 500,000 hectares of primary forest annually to extract cobalt for electric vehicle batteries. Chile destroys its desert ecosystems to exploit lithium for European vehicles.
This fragmentation reveals the limits of international climate agreements. The Paris Agreement sets carbon reduction targets without regulating the transfer of extractive pollution toward developing countries. The decarbonization of rich countries is accompanied by an intensification of destructive extraction in poor countries.
The Automobile Industry Discovers the Hidden Costs of Its Decarbonization
European automakers are beginning to measure the environmental costs of their electric transition. Volkswagen and Stellantis now finance reforestation programs in Indonesia to offset the impact of their nickel supplies.
These initiatives remain marginal compared to the scale of deforestation linked to batteries. Volkswagen invests 50 million euros in Indonesian reforestation, or 0.1% of its electrification budget over five years. This disproportion illustrates the difficulty in internalizing the environmental costs of the energy transition.
Some manufacturers are attempting to secure more sustainable supplies. Tesla sources partially from certified Australian mines, but pays 15% more for nickel than in Indonesia. BMW is developing a blockchain traceability program for its batteries, without being able to guarantee the sustainable origin of the nickel used.
This belated awareness reveals the automobile industry’s unpreparedness regarding the environmental challenges of its decarbonization. Manufacturers have sized their energy transition based on production volumes, without anticipating the territorial conflicts of use it generates in extractive countries.
Brazilian Forest Diplomacy Asserts Itself Against Chinese Contradictions
Brazil is using its forest successes to weigh in on international trade negotiations. Lula da Silva conditions Brazilian agricultural exports on reciprocal climate commitments from its trading partners.
This strategy is paying off with the European Union. The European regulation on imported deforestation, which came into force at the end of 2025, requires complete traceability of Brazilian agricultural products. In return, Brazil obtains preferential access to the European market and green financing for its reforestation programs.
China resists these environmental requirements more strongly. Beijing imports 40% of its beef and 60% of its soybeans from Brazil, but refuses to condition these purchases on forest criteria. This Chinese position weakens Brazilian efforts to generalize sustainable agriculture.
The Brazilian government now threatens to tax exports to countries that do not adopt equivalent environmental standards. This offensive forest diplomacy could redistribute global trade flows according to climate criteria, creating new South-South power dynamics.
Brazilian forest success demonstrates that a state can reverse deforestation through political will. But it also reveals how the global energy transition exports its environmental contradictions to other territories. Indonesia pays today the forest price for European and Chinese decarbonization, creating a new geography of ecological inequalities that structures international power relations.