The founding treaty is unequivocal: the EU budget must be “entirely financed by own resources.” This principle, enshrined in 1970, has never been respected. Fifty-five years later, member states finance three-quarters of the European budget directly through transfers from their national treasuries. The direct contribution of member states, known as the “GNI resource,” accounts for 64% of the EU budget in 2025. This signals a Union that has yet to decide whether it is an emerging federation or an elaborate intergovernmental organization.
This shift is not trivial. When Europe finances itself like a club that divides membership fees, every budget decision becomes an arm-wrestling match between net contributors and net beneficiaries. Common ambitions are measured first by the thermometer of “juste retour”—fair return. And every new expenditure, every new priority (defense, climate, industrial competitiveness) mechanically translates into a rise in the checks that capitals send to Brussels.
From Autonomy to Dependence, in Forty Years
The European budget, originally designed to be fed by “own resources” without passing through member states, has evolved toward a more intergovernmental model. The turning point came in 1988. A fourth resource was added in the form of a direct state contribution based on each member state’s gross domestic product. By 2000, state contributions represented 40% of the European budget; they represented 75% by 2013.
The mechanism is simple to understand. The main resource, known as the “GNI resource,” is based on the economic weight of each member state. It represents between two-thirds and three-quarters of total budget resources depending on the year. It is designed as an adjustment variable: when autonomous revenues fall short, the dial of the national contribution is turned up. The GNI-based resource, which covered only 20% of spending in 1995, today accounts for 72% of the Union’s revenues.
This shift has produced a lasting political consequence: the system of corrections and rebates. Once each state measures what it pays and what it receives, some have demanded compensation. Although the “British rebate” introduced in 1984 no longer applies, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden continue to benefit from lump-sum corrections during the 2021-2027 period.
France, for its part, has never benefited from such a rebate. France is the main contributor to the corrections granted to several member states, notably financing 27% of the British rebate and 22% of all rebates. It benefits from no rebate itself. France’s contribution level for 2025 amounts to 23.3 billion euros, or 17% of the Union’s own resources.
This system of direct contributions produces another pathology: unanimity. The own resources system is subject to a unanimous decision by the Council, which takes into account the opinion of the European Parliament, and must be ratified by each member state. Each reform is a parade of potential veto oppositions. In 2011, the Commission had proposed a financial transaction tax as an own resource. The European Parliament had supported the proposal.
The necessary unanimous agreement of member states could not be obtained, even though broad consensus had emerged on the need for reform. The 2017 Monti report, commissioned by the three European institutions, reached the same conclusion and formulated similar proposals. The way the EU budget is financed must change. Any new European resource would not only be more transparent and more accountable than national contributions based on GNI: it would also reduce them. Nine years later, the essential remains to be done.
The Bill of 2028
The status quo becomes untenable on a specific date. Repayment of the common loan contracted for the NextGenerationEU recovery plan is to begin in 2028 and stretch until 2058. This loan made it possible to mobilize 750 billion euros after the pandemic, including a portion in non-repayable grants to recipients.
It is these grants that the European budget must repay: approximately 24 billion euros per year for thirty years. If no new revenues are created by then, the bill automatically reverts to member states via their GNI contribution. The Court of Auditors estimates that if the new own resources proposed by the Commission do not materialize, France should pay approximately 2.5 billion euros additional per year starting in 2028. For a country whose current contribution already reaches 23.3 billion, that is an increase of more than ten percentage points.
This constraint has forced the Commission to finally put precise proposals on the table. The European Commission presented on July 16, 2025 its proposal for the next multiannual financial framework 2028-2034, with a commitment ceiling of 1,763 billion euros. The Commission proposes new own resources and adjustments to existing resources, which will relieve pressure on national budgets by generating 58.5 billion euros per year.
The CBAM, Climate Tool Turned into Budgetary Issue
Among these new resources, the carbon border adjustment mechanism is the only one already operational. The mechanism, adopted in 2023 and entering its final phase in 2026, applies to products imported into the EU from third countries: iron, steel, cement, fertilizers, aluminum, electricity, hydrogen. The principle is that of competitive fairness: European companies already pay for their CO₂ emissions via the emissions trading system launched in 2005; the emission allowance for one ton of CO₂ stands between 80 and 90 euros, a level ten times higher than that practiced in China. The mechanism imposes an equivalent price on importers, preventing European climate virtue from being paid for through emissions displacement.
Its revenues are modest in the short term. The CBAM is estimated at approximately 500 million euros in 2026, should reach 1.5 billion euros in 2028, and 2.1 billion in 2030. These revenues currently accumulate in national budgets. The Commission proposes that, starting in 2028, 75% be allocated to the EU budget. In the medium term, the potential is more significant: at the European scale, revenues are projected at 5 to 9 billion euros in 2030 and 6 to 22 billion in 2035 under the current scope, rising to 16 to 31 billion under an expanded scope.
This potential depends on three parameters beyond direct control: the price of carbon on the European market, the pace of elimination of free allowances, and the expansion of sectoral scope. Discussions are progressing slowly and a breakthrough is not anticipated in the short term. Member states termed “frugal” fear that an agreement on new own resources will push other states to multiply spending. The logic of “juste retour” blocks the reform of financing, which would itself block the logic of “juste retour.”
Allocating Carbon to the European Budget, and Changing Who Decides
The choice posed for 2027 does not concern the amount of the CBAM: it is too small to change Europe’s financing structure on its own. It concerns architecture: who owns the revenues that the Union produces through its own policies?
The own resources system should be reformed to help address new challenges and designed so as to produce more benefits than a simple flow of tax revenues. The Monti report had laid down the principle back in 2017: new resources could be based on a carbon tax, a common fuel tax, or another environmental tax; these new revenue sources could finance a significant portion of the EU budget while supporting European action. Eight years later, the Commission’s proposal for 2028-2034 reprises this principle.
The institutional rupture to be made is to allocate 100% to the European budget all revenues produced by common policies (the CBAM, carbon allowances, and tomorrow possibly digital taxes) and to eliminate in return national correction mechanisms. The Senate formulated this same recommendation in its 2025 report: a 100% allocation of revenues from the carbon adjustment mechanism and a 100% allocation of traditional own resources to the EU budget. This change modifies who perceives, who decides, and on what basis discussions take place in Brussels: Europe stops negotiating membership fees and starts governing revenues it has itself created.
The political cost is real. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden lose their lump-sum corrections. Within the framework of the June 2026 European Council, it became apparent that new own resources have become one of the main stakes in negotiations over the next multiannual financial framework.
The negotiation window remains open until the adoption of the CFP 2028-2034, likely in 2027. What this choice makes possible is concrete: a Union capable of financing its investments in competitiveness, defense, and climate transition without depending on the annual goodwill of twenty-seven national treasuries. What it closes: the possibility for each government to wield its contribution as a pressure lever on every European decision. Thierry Chopin, who has analyzed populist dynamics within European institutions, emphasizes that so long as the EU budget is perceived as a net transfer between states, it nourishes exactly the sovereigntist resentment it claims to contain [14].
France has a structural interest in this reform. It is the only major net contributor that benefits from no rebate. More than 70% of the Union’s revenues come from direct national contributions. The budget remains dependent on the will of national governments, with no possibility of raising revenues autonomously. So long as this architecture persists, European ambition will always be measured by the ceiling of what the most reluctant governments are willing to sign.
Sources
[1] European Parliament, “History of Own Resources in Europe,” European Parliament, 2013, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/fr/headlines/eu-affairs/20130723STO17551/historique-des-ressources-propres-en-europe (accessed 04/11/2026).
[2] National Assembly, “Financial Relations with the European Union,” annex to Budget Bill 2023, Directorate of the Budget / Ministry of Finance, 2022, https://www.budget.gouv.fr/documentation/file-download/19101 (accessed 04/11/2026).
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[12] LIFE EN SPIRE / ResearchGate, “CBAM and Budgetary Revenue Prospects for the EU and Poland,” 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398368022 (accessed 04/11/2026).
[13] European Commission / Senate, “The New System of Own Resources for the European Union,” Senate report r25-888, 2025, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r25-888/r25-888_mono.html (accessed 04/11/2026).
[14] Thierry Chopin, “Fragmentation and Rise of Populisms in Europe,” Montaigne Institute / Cairn, 2025, https://shs.cairn.info/publications-de-thierry-chopin–6284 (accessed 04/11/2026).
[15] Monti High-Level Group, “Future Financing of the EU: Final Report and Recommendations,” European Commission, January 2017, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2018-10/future-financing-hlgor-final-report_2016_en.pdf (accessed 04/11/2026).
[16] European Commission, Proposal CFP 2028-2034, July 16, 2025, Senate / National Assembly summary, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r25-888/r25-888_mono.html (accessed 04/11/2026).
[17] Senate, Budget Bill Report 2025: European Affairs, L24-144-22, 2024, https://www.senat.fr/rap/l24-144-22/l24-144-22_mono.html (accessed 04/11/2026).
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