Recruiting nurses in Jordan by foreign hospitals represents an aggravated shortage in the country, while a Jordanian nursing degree typically lasts four years. The WHO revised its Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment of Health Personnel in November 2026 to transform these one-way flows into investment partnerships. In the Eastern Mediterranean region, 2.1 million healthcare workers will be missing by 2030 if current trajectories continue. Existing agreements have rarely produced benefits proportional to the systems of originating countries and few include operational commitments to strengthen capacity.

Key points

  • International mobility of healthcare workers transfers training costs to the poorest countries, without systematic compensation mechanisms.
  • The WHO revised its Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment in November 2026 to include care workers, health crises, and investment partnerships between sending and receiving countries (WHO, Health Workforce Migration).
  • The Eastern Mediterranean region faces an expected deficit of 2.1 million healthcare workers by 2030, according to WHO EMRO.
  • Existing bilateral agreements regulate the flow but rarely finance training in countries that produce the workers.
  • The 2026 revision creates the conditions for these agreements to become investment instruments, encouraging recruiting countries to conclude transparent and measurable co-investment arrangements with countries of origin.

A flow that has accelerated over twenty years

The mobility of health personnel follows simple logic: salaries in high-income countries exceed those in training countries by five to ten times over, and working conditions are often better. This attraction is not new. What has changed since 2020 is its scale and intensity.

The pandemic exposed massive deficits in wealthy countries’ health systems. Germany, the United Kingdom, and Gulf countries opened active recruitment corridors toward North Africa, the Near East, and South Asia. The Philippines have been sending nurses to every continent for forty years and have institutionalized this export. Kenya, Ghana, and Ethiopia see their doctors depart—trained at great expense by public universities.

Healthcare workers have the right to choose where to practice, and international mobility in itself is not the issue. The asymmetry lies elsewhere: recruiting countries benefit from human capital they did not finance, while countries of origin absorb the cost of training and the resulting shortage. A doctor trained in Egypt represents a significant cost to the state. International recruitment can save training costs for host countries, while proportionate investments expected in source countries often remain insufficient.

The Middle East: recruiter and recruited simultaneously

The Eastern Mediterranean region illustrates the complexity of these flows better than anywhere else. It is simultaneously an exporter and importer of healthcare workers, depending on the income levels of the countries involved.

Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, recruit massively from abroad. Approximately 70% of health personnel working in Gulf Cooperation Council countries are expatriates. These countries pay well, build modern hospital infrastructure, and attract healthcare workers from various backgrounds. Their model remains dependent on expatriate personnel, but it includes explicit objectives for training and nationalizing the health workforce.

At the other end of the spectrum, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Iraq—devastated by decades of conflict—have seen some of their trained health professionals depart. Syria illustrates what war does to a health system: before 2011, the country trained enough doctors to meet its needs and export them. Today, entire areas operate with a doctor-to-patient ratio matching what Europe knew in the mid-twentieth century.

Between these two poles, countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt play a hybrid role. They train competent healthcare workers, export some to the Gulf or Europe, and attempt to maintain their own health systems with constrained budgets. Jordan, for example, trains more nurses than its internal market can absorb at the offered salary level. It therefore exports structurally, and the deficit it creates internally is partly compensated by remittances from abroad, but not by reinvestment in training.

This is the context the WHO has in mind when it mentions 2.1 million missing healthcare workers in the region by 2030. This figure is not a catastrophic extrapolation. The projected deficit results from combined regional factors, including insufficient production relative to population growth and needs, underinvestment, poor distribution, insufficient retention, and crises.

The limitations of the 2010 WHO Code

The WHO’s Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, adopted in 2010, was a step forward. It posed a simple principle: member states should refrain from actively recruiting in countries facing critical shortages. It encouraged transparency, information sharing, and equitable bilateral agreements.

Sixteen years later, the balance sheet is mixed. The Code was voluntary. No sanctions mechanism existed. And it did not anticipate several major developments: the rise of private international recruitment platforms operating outside any state framework; the emergence of care workers in home care as a new, massively mobile category; and the acceleration of health crises pushing states to recruit urgently regardless of consequences for source countries.

The revision was adopted on May 23, 2026; a second edition of the Code incorporating these amendments was published on November 8, 2026; it attempts to correct these gaps on three points. It expands the Code’s scope to include care workers—home aides, care assistants, and non-medical healthcare workers who now represent a growing share of mobility flows. And above all, it integrates the notion of investment partnership: recruiting countries are invited to finance training in countries of origin, so as to compensate for lost capacity.

This third point is the most ambitious and least guaranteed. The invitation remains non-binding. But it shifts the register: the revision strengthens the cooperation and mutual benefit dimension of a Code that already included cooperation objectives and bilateral agreements. It also encourages measures to mitigate personnel losses during health crises, particularly by regulating emergency recruitment; during the pandemic, mechanisms facilitated international recruitment and restricted certain personnel exits, while equitable application of Code principles in times of crisis remained insufficient.

The concrete definition of an investment partnership

A few countries have already experimented with forms of partnership before the 2026 revision formalized them. The British example is instructive. The National Health Service, the British public health system, has signed agreements with several African and Asian countries that combine active recruitment and financing of local training. These agreements set quotas, minimum periods of practice in Britain before possible return, and financial transfers to training institutions in countries of origin. They remain fragile, incentives for return are insufficient in most cases, but they provide an operational model.

In the Eastern Mediterranean region, WHO EMRO, the organization’s regional bureau based in Cairo, published an investment portfolio for 2025–2028 that prioritizes investment, increase and retention of personnel, transformation of education, and a regional collaboration and partnership mechanism. The report emphasizes that the healthcare worker-to-population ratio in low-income countries in the region stands around 10 per 10,000 inhabitants, compared with an approximate density between 63 and 108 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 inhabitants in Gulf countries depending on the country. Closing this gap through local training would require substantial external support.

Gulf countries have only partially integrated this logic of reciprocity. Gulf countries invest in training and employment of their own nationals; a demonstrated comparison with their investments in source countries is lacking. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have launched internal programs for Saudization and Emiratization of health positions, but these policies aim to reduce dependence on expatriates by training their own nationals, not to compensate for losses in neighboring training countries. The logic is economically understandable. International recruitment can worsen shortages in source countries when it is not accompanied by guarantees and support, without proven causal attribution to the Gulf countries’ model alone.

The Emirates finance ultramodern hospitals in Jordan and Egypt as part of their health diplomacy. These investments improve local healthcare supply, but do not guarantee that trained healthcare workers will remain in place rather than migrate to the Emirates themselves, into these same hospitals that have become more attractive. Investment in infrastructure without anchoring by wages and working conditions can paradoxically accelerate mobility rather than curb it.

Care workers: a blind spot in the debate

The 2026 Code revision fills a long-ignored gap by including care workers. This category groups millions of people, predominantly women, who care for the elderly, chronically ill, and children in host countries. The Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and several North African countries are the main suppliers.

These flows are less visible than those of doctors or nurses, but their impact on countries of origin is equally real. A home care worker who leaves to work in Germany or Italy is not counted in health migration statistics, but she is missed by her own family, her neighbors, local elderly care structures developing in countries experiencing demographic transition. Lebanon, which combines rapid aging of its resident population with massive emigration of its working-age adults since 2019, faces this deficit in informal care acutely.

Including these workers in the Code does not mean blocking their mobility. It means making them visible in agreements, counting their departure in partnership assessments, and providing compensation mechanisms adapted to their specific situation: they are often employed by individuals or private agencies, not by states, which complicates usual bilateral negotiation frameworks.

The question of teleconsultation merits being posed as a counterpoint. Experiments conducted in Latin America show that telemedicine can partially compensate for the physical absence of healthcare workers in underserved areas. In the Eastern Mediterranean region, digital infrastructure remains unequal, but the principle—compensating through technology what human mobility removes—deserves to be integrated into the investment partnerships the Code now encourages.

Urgent decisions before 2030

The 2030 horizon set by the WHO for the deficit of 2.1 million healthcare workers corresponds to international health and development objectives; long training timelines complicate achieving these objectives but do not determine them. A doctor who began studies today would graduate after 2030. A nurse trained in 2027 would be operational sooner, but first medical schools must be built or expanded, trainers recruited, budgets stabilized.

This timeline means that financing decisions must be made now to have an effect before 2030. Bilateral agreements currently being negotiated will frame the mobilization of resources toward training capacity and implementation of the revised Code. Experience with robotics in other sectors shows that structural transformations of the labor market play out over decades, not political mandates: healthcare worker mobility obeys the same long temporality.

Several countries in the region have begun taking autonomous measures. Egypt has increased its nursing training capacity and seeks to retain its doctors through retention bonuses in rural areas. Jordan is experimenting with minimum service contracts for doctors trained at public universities. Morocco launched a plan to strengthen its medical schools with the objective of doubling the number of graduates by 2030. These initiatives are real and documented.

They risk training healthcare workers whose departures will be worsened by the absence of co-investments, in a context where salaries, working conditions, and professional prospects remain major factors driving mobility.

This is precisely why the investment clause in the 2026 Code revision matters. It creates a framework for requiring countries benefiting from mobility, including Gulf states, to contribute to reproducing the human capital they consume. The question that will arise in coming bilateral negotiations is one of bargaining power: a country needing to send its healthcare workers abroad so that its nationals can send foreign currency to their families has little leverage to demand compensation for training. The WHO can create a norm. States decide whether to respect it or not.

Innovations like xenotransplantation modify the boundaries of what is possible in medicine, but they remain without effect if health systems lack personnel to deploy them. The tension between technical progress and human capacity to administer it runs through all debates on global health. In the Eastern Mediterranean, this tension takes on a particularly concrete form: hospitals can be equipped, protocols can be improved, budgets can increase, but if trained healthcare workers leave before providing care, the system remains fragile.

The WHO Code revision does not solve this problem. It poses it, finally, in the right terms: no longer as a question of recruitment, but as a question of shared investment in a global common good that is health personnel.


Sources

  1. World Health Organization, Health Workforce Migration: https://www.who.int/teams/health-workforce/migration
  2. WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Bureau (EMRO), Investing in a resilient health workforce: https://applications.emro.who.int/docs/WHOEMWHD027E-eng.pdf
  3. World Health Organization, Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, 2026 revision: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240080690