In 2024, funding allocated to police and gendarmerie reaches 24.4 billion euros, 33% more than in 2016 [8]. Over the same period, clearance rates decline for nearly all indicators of serious violence [8]. The choice facing the state in 2027 is direct: redirect this spending toward a genuine investigation capacity and specialized victim support, or continue financing a presence that records crimes without solving them.
450,000 recorded victims, and a far broader reality
In 2024, law enforcement recorded 450,100 victims of physical violence [4]. Of these, 103,700 are minors, representing 23% of the total [4]. Sexual violence affected 122,600 victims, of whom 71,100 were minors, or 58% [4]. More than half of recorded physical violence occurs in a family setting [4].
These figures measure only a fraction of what French people actually experience. The national survey on Experience and Perception of Security (VRS), conducted by SSMSI since 2022, interviews approximately 200,000 people [17]. The earlier survey on Living Conditions and Security (CVS), conducted from 2007 to 2021, interviewed 25,000 [17]. Together, these two mechanisms form the most solid long-term series for measuring the gap between what victims report and what police record [2].
This gap is abyssal. In 2024, the share of sexual violence victims who file a complaint remains between 2% and 6% [2]. For theft, 24% of victims report having filed a complaint [6].
This rate rises to 35% in cases of confirmed theft. It falls to 8% in cases of attempted theft [6]. Among sexual violence victims who did not report the facts, 24% explain that they had lost faith in the system, according to the 2022 VRS survey [6].
Reading recorded crime statistics as if they measured actual crime is a methodological error. In 2024, recorded sexual violence increased by 7%, including +9% for rape and attempted rape [1]. This increase can be explained by greater willingness to come forward and by improved victim reception in services [1]. It may also reflect an actual increase in acts. Both dynamics coexist, and no data allows us to separate them.
In 2024, domestic violence increased by only 3%, against an annual average of 11% between 2016 and 2023 [1]. The number of homicides fell by 2% for the first time since 2020, to 976 victims [1]. This movement remains fragile. In 2025, physical violence resumes its progression at +5%, domestic violence at +6%, and sexual violence at +8% [3].
A generational divergence from Western Europe
A ten-year perspective forces a more severe conclusion. France’s intentional homicide rate has increased by 21% since 2017 [7]. Over the same period, the European Union average declined by 11% [7]. France has moved from 15th to 8th place among 33 countries ranked by Eurostat [7]. Its rate is twice as high as in Italy [7].
In 2024, France has 1.28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants [7]. Only Finland at 1.78 and Belgium at 1.40 perform worse in Western Europe [7]. Germany is at 0.8, Spain at 0.7, Italy at 0.6 [7].
Between 2017 and 2024, attempted homicides jumped by 82% in France [7]. Spain follows at +57%, Greece at +45%, Sweden at +44% [7]. Germany shows -1% [7]. France stands in a category of its own, and this structural divergence demands a structural explanation.
Drug trafficking, the primary driver of the divergence
The increase in attempted homicides has been constant since 2016, with an average progression of 8% per year [1]. In 2016, 2,259 attempts had been recorded [1]. The multiplication of shootings and gang-related killings linked to drug trafficking plays a central role in this trend.
In 2023, law enforcement recorded 418 narco-homicides, a record increase of 38% compared to 2022 [5]. In 2024, 110 people died from drug trafficking [11]. The decline compared to 139 deaths in 2023 is partly explained by the end of a war between two rival groups in Marseille, not by a structural decline [11].
Sirasco recorded 721 instances of criminal violence in 2024 and 2025, responsible for 214 deaths and 657 injuries [12]. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, 90 murders and attempted murders between traffickers were recorded across the country [12]. Rural areas and medium-sized cities are now affected. A Senate investigative committee notes that 90% of gang-related killings are explained by disagreements linked to drug trafficking [12]. The assassination of collateral victims has established what the report characterizes as “narco-terrorism” [12].
Digital crime, the second invisible front
While public debate remains focused on physical violence, a second divergence is taking hold. In 2025, SSMSI recorded 453,200 offenses linked to digital activity, an increase of 14% compared to 2024 [13]. The upward trend averages 12% per year since 2016 [13]. In 2024, digital offenses against property represented 226,300 cases [13].
Fraud benefits from increasingly automated attacks: industrialized phishing, identity theft, rental and tech support scams. The Thésée platform, which centralizes online complaints for fraud, had collected nearly 51,000 complaints in 2024 [13]. That is more than one-fifth of the digital offenses against property recorded that year.
24 billion spent, clearance rates collapsing
In 2024, funding allocated to public security reaches 24.4 billion euros [8]. The National Police absorbs 13.4 billion and the gendarmerie 11 billion [8]. Between 2016 and 2024, this funding increased by 6.1 billion, or +33% [8]. Translated into budget per officer, this represents approximately 96,600 euros per year for each of the 252,300 police officers and gendarmes on duty [8].
Personnel numbers increased by 10,600 full-time equivalents over the period, or +4.4% [8]. The budget therefore grew seven times faster than personnel. This spending did not produce less serious crime. Offenses against property are cleared in fewer than 7% of cases within the year for robbery without violence and burglary [8]. Clearance rates decline for nearly all indicators between 2017 and 2023 [8].
From the start of 2024 budget execution, the National Police budget was cut by 134 million euros in commitment authorizations [9]. Major investment projects were blocked, notably vehicle replacement and real estate initiatives [9].
Concentrating budget increases on personnel line items does not automatically reduce serious crime [8]. Drug trafficking, cybercrime, and the dark figure of domestic violence remain untreated volumes. Technological innovations—cameras, biometric databases, predictive algorithms—can increase investigation capacity. They can also simulate action by reducing qualified human presence in the field. Acemoglu and Johnson document this mechanism in their analysis of the actual effects of digital tools on organizational productivity [15].
Four documented levers to change the trajectory
Rebuild the investigation function
The 2024 Judicial Police reform weakened the investigation function at the very moment when structured drug trafficking demands the opposite reinforcement [14]. In 2024, only 122 million euros were seized in investigations related to narcotics [14]. This represents 11% of the total criminal asset seizures, which reach 1.129 billion euros [14].
The shortfall in criminal assets signals an underfunded financial investigation function. A multi-year program for training and stabilizing teams specializing in organized crime investigation constitutes the most direct lever on the stock of serious violence. Its condition is a clear doctrine: trained specialists must remain in investigation services rather than being reassigned to street-level duties during staffing pressures.
Reduce the dark figure by establishing genuine rights for victims
The 2% to 6% complaint rate for sexual violence reflects a system where victims anticipate the futility of filing [2]. The proportion of sexual violence committed more than a year before filing a complaint rose from 29% in 2016 to approximately 39% since 2021 [6]. The growing delay between the act and the complaint indicates that confidence in the system stagnates. Nordic countries that reduced this dark figure did so by combining specialized reception, victim protection during proceedings, and shortened delays. The counterpart is revaluing victim reception and support positions, currently understaffed relative to public order missions.
Direct digital investment toward increasing investigators
Digital offenses increase by 12% per year on average since 2016 [13]. Priority goes to analyzing the financial flows of networks. This is where technological innovations undoubtedly increase human capacity. Deploying facial recognition or predictive analysis without clear human oversight doctrine produces institutional risks that exceed documented operational benefits [15].
Address drug trafficking across the supply chain
The law of 13 June 2025 equipped France with an arsenal including notably an inter-ministerial command structure and a public prosecution office for organized crime [12]. The national response alone remains structurally insufficient. The cocaine market in Europe is fed by routes transiting through the ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Algeciras.
In 2025, financial pressure instruments constitute the dominant geo-economic weapon, as Edward Fishman documents in his analysis of economic coercion tools [16]. Applied to transnational organized crime, these same instruments remain underutilized. An effective policy passes through a European Judicial Police endowed with real means and financial intelligence cooperation that dries up network revenues. Its condition is lasting multilateral commitment, whose fragility lies in coordination between member states with divergent priorities.
The architectural choice for 2027
The 2027 arbitration concerns budgetary doctrine. It is about ceasing to allocate funding increases to street-level personnel and creating an investigation function with protected status, whose officers cannot be reassigned to public order missions. This reallocation concerns approximately 15% of the additional funding released since 2016, or about one billion euros to redirect [8].
What this choice makes possible: a documented increase in clearance rates for serious offenses, a reduction in the dark figure of domestic and sexual violence, and enhanced capacity to dismantle the financial pipelines of drug trafficking. What it forecloses: the ability to respond to each request for additional street-level personnel by generic recruitment. What it costs: a controversial statutory reform among police unions, and a period of several years before effects on clearance rates are measurable.
Without this choice, the current trajectory continues the divergence: a budget that grows, personnel that increase modestly, and serious violence indicators following the same direction.
Sources
[1] SSMSI, “Insecurity and crime in 2024: statistical overview and departmental atlas,” July 11, 2025, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/insecurite-et-delinquance-en-2024-bilan-statistique-et-atlas-departemental-de-delinquance (accessed 09/09/2026).
[2] SSMSI, “Experience and Perception of Security: Survey Report 2024 Edition,” October 2025, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/vecu-et-ressenti-en-matiere-de-securite-victimation-delinquance-et-sentiment-dinsecurite-rapport (accessed 09/09/2026).
[3] SSMSI, “Key figures: Insecurity and crime in 2024, 2025 edition,” November 2025, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/documentation/etudes-et-statistiques/ssmsi-chiffres-cles-insecurite-et-delinquance-en-2024-edition-2025.html (accessed 09/09/2026).
[4] SSMSI, “Victims of physical or sexual violence recorded by security services in 2024,” Interstats Info Rapide No. 47, February 27, 2025, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/victimes-de-violences-physiques-ou-sexuelles-enregistrees-par-0 (accessed 09/09/2026).
[5] SSMSI, “Insecurity and crime in 2023: statistical overview,” 2024, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/insecurite-et-delinquance-en-2023-bilan-statistique-et-atlas (accessed 09/09/2026).
[6] SSMSI, VRS 2024 report, complete data (core questionnaire), https://www.cfdt-ufetam.org/download.php?file=wp-content%2Fuploads%2F2026%2F06%2Frapport_enquete_ssmsi_vrs-2024.pdf (accessed 09/09/2026).
[7] Eurostat, “Crime statistics: Statistics Explained,” 2024 data, published April 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Crime_statistics (accessed 09/09/2026).
[8] Court of Accounts, 2026 annual report, key security figures (summary La Gazette des Communes), March 2026, https://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/1030267/les-chiffres-cles-sur-la-securite-en-2026-dapres-la-cour-des-comptes/ (accessed 09/09/2026).
[9] Court of Accounts, “Analysis of 2025 budget execution, ‘Security’ Mission,” April 2026, URL unavailable at time of writing (accessed 09/09/2026).
[10] Ministry of Interior, 2024 drug trafficking report (Franceinfo, February 6, 2025), https://www.franceinfo.fr/societe/drogue/le-narcotrafic-a-cause-la-mort-de-110-personnes-en-france-en-2024-selon-le-ministere-de-l-interieur_7058939.html (accessed 09/09/2026).
[11] Senate, investigative committee, “Report on the impact of drug trafficking in France and measures to be taken to address it,” Jérôme Durain, May 7, 2024, https://documentation.insp.gouv.fr/insp/doc/VIAPUBLIQUE/… (accessed 09/09/2026).
[12] SSMSI, “Digital-related offenses in 2025,” report of February 19, 2026 (covered by L’Essor), https://lessor.org/societe/hausse-des-infractions-liees-au-numerique/ (accessed 09/09/2026).
[13] National Assembly, Annual Performance Report, “Security” Mission, 2025, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/dyn/contenu/visualisation/1109936/file/Securites_SB.pdf (accessed 09/09/2026).
[14] Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, PublicAffairs/Pearson, 2023.
[15] Edward Fishman, Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, Penguin Random House, 2025, https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/726149/chokepoints-by-edward-fishman/ (accessed 09/09/2026).
[16] INSEE, series “Victimization Survey: Living Conditions and Security (CVS),” 2007-2021, https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadonnees/source/serie/s1278 (accessed 09/09/2026).
