Technicians, supervisors, nurses, foremen: in 2024, these were the ones who fell behind. Their real net salary declined by 0.1%, while that of manual workers rose by 1.1% [1]. The 2027 decision will be whether to continue subsidizing a floor while leaving the middle of the distribution without rules, or whether to transfer the real power to set wages to professional branches.

A middle ground receding while the extremes move

Between 1996 and 2022, wage inequality overall declined in the private sector. The bottom 10% earned 18.7% more in constant euros; the top 10%, 14.9% [1]. This narrowing of gaps is real.

But it masks a harsher geography. In 2024, one in ten private-sector employees earns less than 1,492 euros net per month. Half earn less than 2,190 euros. One in ten exceeds 4,334 euros [1]. Between these two bounds, middle-skilled professions suffer a compression that neither the legal floor nor professional pay grids correct.

Over the long term, the median in constant euros has risen 13% since 1996 [3]. That amounts to less than 0.5% per year. Between 2008 and 2024, real net salary in full-time equivalent rose 4.2% in constant euros in the private sector, or 0.3% per year on average [1]. Thirty years of career advancement for one month’s additional salary in real purchasing power.

Seventy-five billion that block middle-wage increases

Since 1993, employer payroll tax exemptions have been maximal at the minimum wage level and scaled down until 1.6 times the minimum wage. This scheme represented 75 billion euros in 2023 [7]. Its logic was coherent in the 1990s: make low-skilled work competitive to preserve its volume.

The problem is mechanical. Raising an employee above the threshold sharply increases labour costs. The exemptions decrease or disappear. To pay 100 euros more to an employee near the minimum wage, an employer may spend up to 450 euros in total cost [7]. Result: companies set their pay policies below the thresholds, and promotions stagnate.

The Court of Auditors and France Stratégie documented these effects in 2024 [7][8]. Investment in training is constrained. The effect on industrial employment remains moderate. And wage distribution becomes compressed: this is what the two reports call the “minimum wage lock-in” effect.

The result is visible in professional branches. As of June 1, 2026, 70% of branches have contractual minima below the minimum wage—126 branches out of 179, covering 11.9 million employees [13]. Pay grids exist on paper. In practice, they are inoperative: each company sets what it wants, without any collective reference.

Pressure comes from both sides at once

Two dynamics worsen this structural situation.

Technological innovations hit selectively at routine tasks in the middle of the pay scale—those occupied by technicians and supervisors. The wage compression produced by the exemptions system is compounded by pressure on employment volume in that zone.

Meanwhile, successive minimum wage increases tied to inflation have narrowed the gap between the legal floor and the qualifications just above it. When the minimum wage rises automatically, the first rungs of pay grids move closer to it. Tensions mount at intermediate levels, with no mechanism to pull them upward.

France ranks in the middle of European comparisons for gross annual salaries in 2025 [9]. It outpaces Spain and Italy, but trails Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. The difference stems not only from gross salaries: the share of labour income taken by contributions and taxes is among Europe’s highest according to OECD data [10].

Transfer wage-setting power to professional branches, with results required

The current structure distributes roles perversely. The minimum wage indexed to inflation provides an automatic floor. Branches negotiate grids that nobody respects. Scaled exemptions subsidize the maintenance of low wages. Any increase in the middle of the distribution is simultaneously penalized by loss of exemptions and abandoned by failing branches.

One possible approach for 2027, documented by Bertrand Martinot and Franck Morel in Work is the Solution [14], involves transferring the power to set real wage minima to professional branches, by decoupling the exemptions base from the minimum wage level alone. Exemptions would no longer be tied to a universal threshold but to the skills level defined by the branch. That branch would have to renegotiate its grid regularly or lose its benefits. A branch whose grids stagnate would lose its tax advantages.

This makes possible what does not exist today: a positive right to middle-wage progression, not just a safety net for the lowest paid.

What it closes off: the continuation of the current exemptions policy, which concentrates 75 billion euros on the bottom of the distribution [7][8]. France Stratégie and the Court of Auditors both noted that the employment effectiveness of this spending has become marginal beyond the minimum wage proper [7][8]. Redirecting part of this sum toward middle wages means accepting that the cost of low-skilled labour rises, at least partly. Certain branches, notably in personal services and hospitality, would face a difficult transition.

What it builds: conventional pay grids that become real references again, training whose return becomes visible in the paycheck, and a wage hierarchy that stops being flattened by the mechanics of thresholds.

Sources

[1] INSEE, “Salaries in the Private Sector in 2024,” INSEE Première no. 2079, October 2025, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8657156 (consulted 06/09/2026).

[2] INSEE, “Salaries in the Private Sector in 2022,” INSEE Première no. 1971, November 2023, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/7707884 (consulted 06/09/2026).

[3] INSEE, “Long-term Series on Salaries in the Private Sector and Public Service,” INSEE Results, December 2024, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2122816?sommaire=2122819 (consulted 06/09/2026).

[4] INSEE, Focus no. 230, “Purchasing Power of Net Salary in the Private Sector Rose 13.1% Between 1996 and 2018,” April 2020, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/5351312 (consulted 06/09/2026).

[5] France Stratégie / General Treasury Directorate, Payroll Tax Exemption Policies, report, October 2024, https://www.strategie-plan.gouv.fr/files/2024-11/rapport_vffff_241003.pdf (consulted 06/09/2026).

[6] Court of Auditors, “Payroll Tax Exemption Policies: A Necessary Change,” Public Policy Evaluation Platform, 2024, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/plateformes-citoyennes/plateforme-evaluations-politique-publique/explorer-evaluations/les-46 (consulted 06/09/2026).

[7] France Stratégie / General Treasury Directorate, Payroll Tax Exemption Policies, report, October 2024, https://www.strategie-plan.gouv.fr/files/2024-11/rapport_vffff_241003.pdf (consulted 06/09/2026).

[8] Court of Auditors, “Payroll Tax Exemption Policies: A Necessary Change,” Public Policy Evaluation Platform, 2024, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/plateformes-citoyennes/plateforme-evaluations-politique-publique/explorer-evaluations/les-46 (consulted 06/09/2026).

[9] Eurostat / Euronews, “Average Salaries in Europe: In Which Countries Are Salaries Highest?,” May 2025, https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/05/06/average-salaries-across-europe-which-countries-have-the-highest-pay (consulted 06/09/2026).

[10] OECD, Taxing Wages 2026, April 2026, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/taxing-wages-2026_3a5169ef-en/ (consulted 06/09/2026).

[13] Ministry of Labour / National Wage Monitoring Committee, meeting minutes from May 27, 2026, reported by Hello Work Place, https://www.helloworkplace.fr/salaires-smic-conformite/ (consulted 06/09/2026).

[14] Bertrand Martinot and Franck Morel, Work is the Solution, Hermann, 2025.