The Arab Youth Priority Survey 2026 surveyed 6,260 young people aged 15 to 35 across 22 Arab countries, representing nearly 170 million people. According to the survey, health ranks first, followed by education, family and relationships, employment opportunities, and community security, while political representation is mentioned less frequently.

The essentials

  • The Arab Youth Priority Survey 2026 shows health ranking first, followed by education, family and relationships, employment opportunities, and community security.
  • The survey covers 6,260 face-to-face interviews across 22 Arab countries, comparing priorities with those of 2020 (Arab Youth Center, 2026).
  • The survey highlights priorities related to health, education, employment, and security.
  • States in the region have historically responded to this aspiration through public sector job expansion, which can produce short and medium-term effects that are difficult to reconcile.
  • The way governments respond to this aspiration for economic security will likely have lasting effects on generational trajectories.

170 million young people interviewed face-to-face

The Arab Youth Center did not survey internet users or panelists recruited online. Its teams conducted 6,260 face-to-face interviews across 22 countries, from Morocco to Yemen, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. This format captures responses that online surveys, skewed toward connected urban dwellers, systematically miss. Comparison with the 2020 wave allows us to read a trend, not merely a snapshot.

Health emerges as the dominant priority in the survey. Between 2020 and 2026, health gained in relative importance, while employment opportunities retained a central place among priorities. This result is robust across all 22 countries, despite their considerable differences in income levels, political regimes, and social contexts.

Some will read this as disinterest in democracy. That is a shortcut. Longitudinal surveys on values, notably the Arab Barometer, have shown for years that young Arabs aspire to functioning institutions, not necessarily to any particular institutional form. When the cost of bread absorbs an growing share of disposable income, priorities mechanically reorder themselves. This order of priorities can be interpreted as the effect of immediate economic pressure rather than as disinterest in political issues.

Employment security as a generational compass

Understanding why stable employment takes precedence over everything else requires looking at regional labor market figures. Youth unemployment in Arab countries ranks among the highest in the world. According to the World Bank, several countries in the region show unemployment rates for 15-24 year-olds exceeding 25%. University graduates are often the most affected, a phenomenon known as underemployment from overqualification, where the private market does not generate positions matching the skills being trained.

Thus, “stable employment” means something very specific to these 15-35 year-olds: a contract that provides protection, predictable income, and often, for lack of alternatives, a position in the public sector. The Arab Youth Center survey documents this aspiration without softening it. It reflects lived experience: entering adulthood without a safety net, forming a household impossible to finance, deferring entire life projects for lack of a stable horizon.

This postponement of adulthood has direct demographic consequences. European aging is already paid for in sacrificed careers: the Arab region lives the opposite—a potentially enormous demographic dividend, but one that converts to growth only if these young people find productive jobs. Without that, demographic pressure becomes a fragility.

Cost of living as a political fact

The rise in food and energy prices since 2021-2022 hit the Arab region with particular intensity. Egypt is one of the world’s leading wheat importers by volume, while Yemen and Lebanon rank among the most wheat-import-dependent countries in the MENA region relative to their economies. Waves of imported inflation eroded already tight incomes. The Arab Youth Center survey documents that cost of living ranks among top priorities, reflecting prolonged economic pressure on young households’ budgets.

The political fact is there. When cost of living ranks among top priorities, governments must generally expect high expectations regarding price policy, subsidies, and purchasing power. The budget reforms that the International Monetary Fund recommends in several countries in the region can reduce universal subsidies, but they are recommended with targeted compensations and protection for vulnerable households. Subsidy reforms can reduce purchasing power in the short term and require compensatory measures to preserve their social acceptability and institutional trust.

This tension between fiscal balance and popular legitimacy is not unique to the Arab world. But it is particularly acute there because private or community social safety nets are more fragile. The decline of Catholicism leaves social safety nets without a safety net, an analogous dynamic operates in societies where traditional solidarity structures are eroding without formal institutions stepping in.

Health as a concrete institutional test

Access to care ranks among top priorities. This positioning clarifies the nature of the demand addressed to Arab states: young people are demanding services that work when they need them.

In several countries in the region, public health systems suffer from a double fragility. Infrastructure is insufficient in rural and peri-urban areas. In several countries, access to care is often tied to formal employment status, which can exclude young people in informal or precarious work. A young person working without a contract often has no access to health coverage. Their only option is direct payment, which can absorb a catastrophic share of their income in case of serious health problems.

The Arab Youth Center survey documents the priority placed on health without detailing the mechanisms. But the logic is clear: for these young people, access to care is an indicator of the state’s capacity to protect them regardless of their labor market status. A state that ties health coverage to formal employment risks penalizing those without access to stable positions and potentially strengthens the appeal of public sector employment as a path to security.

Public employment or productive insertion: the choice that will determine 2035

The 2026 survey measures priorities related to employment, income, and health; the opposition between public and private productive employment is an interpretation that must be supported separately.

Arab states have a historical response to this question: expanding the civil service. It worked for decades, sustained by oil rents in Gulf countries and by assertive public budgets elsewhere. But this response produces two effects over time. It inflates public sector wage bills which, in several countries in the region, can weigh on public finances and come with inefficiencies. And it creates dependency: some young people who enter the civil service by default risk not developing skills that the private market values, which can reduce their employability in the productive sector.

Institutional trust can stabilize in the short term, but risks weakening if budgetary resources decline.

The alternative—developing a private labor market capable of offering stable, qualified jobs—is well-known. It requires several things that work together. Training policies that connect degrees to real business needs. Portable social protections, that is, not tied to public employment status, health coverage accessible to any formal private worker, retirement savings that do not depend on sector of employment. And labor market regulation that makes the private contract as secure as the public position, without reproducing its rigidity.

These reforms take time. They require investments that do not produce visible results for several years. And they demand reducing advantages granted to civil servants in place, which generates immediate political resistance. Australian productivity stagnates for lack of business renewal, the problem is different, but the underlying mechanism is similar: without productive dynamism, existing jobs protect themselves at the expense of entrants.

A few Arab countries have begun to move in this direction. Saudi Arabia has pursued a Saudization of private employment since at least 2011; Vision 2030, launched in 2016, supports localization of employment; ministerial decisions and the Nitaqat program set quotas applicable in several sectors, while Vision 2030 invests in vocational training. The results are real but partial: the private sector is hiring more nationals in some sectors, but the quality and stability of these jobs remain variable. The United Arab Emirates has undertaken similar reforms with emphasis on digital skills. Morocco is developing industrial zones that attract foreign investment and create private jobs, with still-fragile conditions but measurable momentum.

These avenues for progress exist. They are neither guaranteed nor sufficient. The signals to monitor by 2035 are precise: the share of 15-35 year-olds in stable private employment in the countries covered by the survey, and the evolution of declared confidence in institutions in the next survey waves. If the first rises without the second following, the problem is political communication. If both move together, something more fundamental has been built.

Lessons from the 2020-2026 comparison

The strength of the Arab Youth Priority Survey 2026 lies precisely in its comparability with the 2020 wave. Six years separate the two waves, six years that include the Covid-19 shock, global inflation waves, regional conflicts, and political transitions in several countries. Reading the shifts between the two surveys means reading what these years did to a generation’s priorities.

Between 2020 and 2026, health progressed in the ranking, while employment opportunities retained a central place among priorities. This shift is consistent with what we observe: the Edelman Gen Z Lab documents in several regions of the world a trend among under-30s to prioritize economic security over other values, including in high-income countries. In Arab countries, this trend overlaps with concrete experience of vulnerability, not merely as abstract fear but as lived reality in family budgets, employment trajectories, and access to care.

A declarative survey does not allow determining the extent to which the priority given to material issues reflects resignation about other expectations. Political representation appears less often among declared priorities; we cannot determine whether it is less desired or whether it seems less accessible. The next wave, provided the face-to-face method is maintained and a comparable sample is used, will provide an answer.

Meanwhile, the Arab Youth Priority Survey 2026 provides, from 6,260 face-to-face interviews, a comparable estimate of priorities for young people in 22 Arab countries representing nearly 170 million people. Governments wanting to convert this urgency into lasting confidence have a clear map. It remains to be seen which instruments they will choose to respond to it, and whether portable social protections, regulated labor markets, and active training policies will find political coalitions capable of carrying them.


Sources

  1. Arab Youth Center, Arab Youth Priority Survey 2026: https://www.arabyouthcenter.org/en/article/our-research/arab-youth-priority-survey-2026
  2. World Bank, Data on youth unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa region: https://data.worldbank.org
  3. Arab Barometer, survey waves on values and political expectations in the Arab world (Arab Barometer, no specific URL per wave)
  4. Edelman Gen Z Lab, report on Gen Z priorities in several regions (Edelman, no specific report URL)