Australia lost 0.2% of productivity over the year through June 2026. This figure places the Australian economy barely 1% above its 2015-2019 average, after more than a decade. The Productivity Commission, the public agency tasked with analyzing the country’s economic performance, identifies the cause: the business landscape is renewing at a slower pace, and this slowness is eroding living standards.

The essentials

  • Australian productivity fell 0.2% over the year through June 2026 and barely exceeds its 2015-2019 average (Productivity Commission, September 2026).
  • The Commission links this stagnation to a weakening of business dynamism: fewer new entrants, fewer exits, less reallocation of resources toward productive uses.
  • The central mechanism is creative destruction: productivity gains are associated with the complete renewal of businesses, including entry, growth, adaptation, restructuring, and exit.
  • Regulatory barriers to entry and measures that artificially sustain low-productivity firms block this flow.
  • If public policies do not restore the conditions for renewal of the productive landscape, the Australian economy risks maintaining its living standards through debt mechanisms rather than through increased value creation.

The concrete meaning of productivity

Productivity measures what an economy produces per hour worked. When it stagnates, real wages stop rising sustainably, investment margins shrink, and the state has fewer resources to fund its services without going into debt. Australia is not in crisis. But it has been treading water for ten years, and the comparison with its own past trajectory is severe.

The fact that an economy is barely 1% more productive than it was between 2015 and 2019 after seven additional years of work and investment says something precise: the expected gains from accumulated capital, adopted technologies, and acquired skills over that period did not materialize. Something is blocking the conversion of these resources into additional output.

The Productivity Commission, in its report Unlocking Business Dynamism published in November 2026, makes the diagnosis: that something is the slowdown in business renewal.

The engine of productivity gains is flow, not stock

The prevailing intuition holds that productivity advances when existing firms work better: adopt new technologies, train their employees more effectively, optimize their processes. This intuition captures part of the reality. It misses a larger part.

Business renewal is an important driver of aggregate productivity, among other determinants. Firms enter, bringing new methods, disrupting established practices, capturing market share. Firms exit, freeing their employees and capital for new uses. Existing firms accelerate or decelerate depending on whether their model holds up against new entrants.

It is this flow—entries, differentiated growth, exits—that reallocates a country’s productive resources toward their most efficient uses. When this flow slows, even an economy whose existing firms are performing well can lose its capacity to progress as a whole.

The Australian Commission measures this slowdown across multiple indicators: declining business creation rates, increased persistence of dominant firms and falling exits, declining employment share in young firms. The Australian economy is renewing more slowly than it used to, and this slowdown in renewal contributes to the weak level of aggregate productivity growth.

The barriers that block entry and delay exit

The two types of obstacles do not operate independently. Barriers to entry and measures sustaining firms artificially reinforce each other: when low-productivity firms durably occupy resources, they reduce the competitive pressure that would incentivize existing firms to improve their practices. The potential entrant calculating their chances of capturing market share factors in this reality. If incumbent structures do not exit, the economic space available for a new entrant contracts, even when formal barriers to entry decline. Reforming one without the other thus produces limited effects.

Easing entry procedures without accelerating the exit of non-viable firms only partially displaces the problem without solving it. Conversely, facilitating exit without reducing entry costs frees resources that no one can capture efficiently. It is the simultaneity of both movements that conditions the restoration of the reallocation flow, and it is precisely this simultaneity that makes reform politically difficult, as each dimension mobilizes distinct forms of resistance within different sectors and interest groups.

The Commission identifies several categories of obstacles, notably regulatory, financial, managerial, and those linked to transitions and insolvency. Starting a business in Australia involves lengthy regulatory procedures, high compliance costs, and access to financing conditioned on guarantees that existing firms can provide but that new ventures rarely can. These obstacles characterize most developed economies, but their accumulation can make entry, growth, and adaptation of firms more difficult.

Then there are the mechanisms sustaining firms artificially. Public programs, sectoral aid, guarantees, regulatory exemptions, initially designed to cushion temporary shocks, have become permanent. They allow firms whose productivity is durably below average to continue operating, to occupy capital and employ workers who would probably be more productive elsewhere. The Commission calls these firms “zombies,” a technical term designating structures that survive but do not contribute to economic progress.

The cost of this artificial support can be read in the reallocation figures.

A problem that becomes costly before becoming visible

Australia’s apparent living standards remain high. Unemployment is low. Consumption holds up. Nothing in current indicators signals an imminent crisis. This is precisely what makes the Commission’s diagnosis difficult to translate into political urgency.

Productivity stagnation settles in slowly. It does not trigger a visible recession, but it creates a gap between the progression of real wages and the increase in household debt and public services financed by deficits rather than by growing tax revenues.

Australia has benefited for several decades from its natural resources—minerals, energy, agriculture—which generate export revenues independent of the productivity of the rest of the economy. This rent partially masks the stagnation. It finances a living standard that no longer entirely corresponds to the productive performance of the non-resource business landscape. This gap between rent and performance is sustainable in the short term. Over a ten-year horizon, it poses the question of what happens when the terms of trade on resources reverse.

The comparison with South Korea, which massively automated its industry without wages advancing in proportion, illustrates a similar tension: an economy can accumulate productive resources without the gains being distributed if reallocation mechanisms do not work.

Two trajectories for the next decade

The Australian Commission’s diagnosis goes beyond the Australian case. A developed economy recovers sustainable gains in living standards by restoring the conditions for firm entry, growth, and exit. These conditions determine trajectories through 2035.

In a first scenario, public policies tackle the two identified obstacles. Entry procedures simplify—timelines shorten, compliance costs fall, financing becomes accessible to firms without a track record. Liquidation and restructuring procedures accelerate so that an unviable firm’s exit frees its resources within a year rather than over several years. Public aid to existing firms becomes conditional on productivity criteria rather than on short-term employment maintenance alone. In this trajectory, the renewal flow resumes and resources are reallocated.

In a second scenario, the obstacles remain in place. Regulatory barriers to entry persist, low-productivity firms continue to benefit from artificial survival programs. Productivity stagnates around its current level, while the economy’s capacity to adapt weakens in the face of external shocks. External shocks—reversals in commodity markets, increased competition from economies with higher technological intensity—would find an economy less able to reconfigure itself.

These two trajectories are not symmetric in their likelihood. The second requires no decision: it is the default outcome if nothing changes. The first requires specific policy choices, in domains—the law on troubled firms, conditions for access to financing, the architecture of sectoral aid—that do not have the visibility of electoral campaign topics.

What should be measured to know if things are moving

The Australian Commission identifies two signals that would allow us to know whether public policies are producing real effects on business dynamism.

The first is the renewal rate of the productive landscape: the ratio between net business creations and total existing stock, measured each year. A stable or rising rate signals that barriers to entry are receding. A declining rate confirms that obstacles are accumulating.

The second is the share of resources—capital and employment—allocated to firms created less than five years ago. Young firms play an important role in job and value-added creation, and can experience rapid productivity growth. When this share declines, it constitutes one among several indicators of weakening dynamism.

These two indicators do not make headlines in economic news. Yet they measure something more fundamental than unemployment or consumption figures: the vitality of the mechanism that transforms an economy’s resources into future living standards.

The good news is that these mechanisms can be modified. Regulatory barriers to entry were built through the accumulation of decisions; they can be dismantled by contrary decisions. Liquidation procedures can be accelerated without disadvantaging creditors or penalizing workers, as several European countries have shown by simplifying their insolvency law since 2010. Access to financing for firms without collateral can expand without increasing systemic risk, as shown by loan guarantee programs calibrated to productivity growth rather than balance sheet assets. The tools exist.

The question is whether Australian policymakers will give them the priority their measurement warrants.


Sources

  1. Australian Productivity Commission, Unlocking Business Dynamism, interim report, November 2026
  2. Australian Productivity Commission, Productivity Update, September 2026 (available at pc.gov.au)