In sixteen years, the age at which a young French doctorate holder lands a stable position in public research has gone back by nearly two years. During that same period, the age at which they obtain their doctorate has not shifted by a week.
Two more years waiting for a position you have deserved for a long time
Over sixteen years, the recruitment ages for research fellows and university lecturers have increased by roughly twenty-four and thirty-two months respectively. This is not due to longer studies: over the same period, the average age at doctoral defense has remained stable, around 30.5 years. What is stretching is the gray zone between the thesis and the permanent position. Years of short contracts, chained postdoctorates, budgeted uncertainty.
Between 2007 and 2023, the average age of successful candidates in recruitment competitions for research fellows in public institutions rose from 31 to 34.4 years: that is, twenty-three months more. That of university lecturers increased by twenty-two months. Meanwhile, the average age of tenured faculty members in position rose from 64 years in 2010 to 65.8 years in 2023, also by twenty-two months, as a result of pension reform. The profession is aging at both ends: young people enter later, senior researchers leave later.
The number of positions published by institutions has fallen by 45 percent since 2010. The drop was 51 percent between 2009 and 2019, before a rebound: published positions went from 1,800 in 2021 to 2,500 in 2024, their highest level since 2014. The recent rebound is real, but it comes after a decade of erosion that shaped an entire generation of doctorate holders to treat waiting as the norm.
This waiting carries a precise human cost. A researcher recruited at 34 instead of 31 loses three years of scientific production at their peak age: when one takes the most fruitful intellectual risks. The literature on innovation, documented by Philippe Aghion in his work on Schumpeterian growth, shows that major scientific breakthroughs generally emerge among researchers still free from institutional constraints. Making young doctorate holders wait is to defer precisely that freedom.
What France pays without receiving
According to data from the Engineers and Scientists of France association, 15 percent of active engineers were working abroad at the end of 2024, that is 150,000 people, compared with less than 12 percent at the end of 2022. Public training expenses corresponding to a cohort of expatriates are estimated at 2 billion euros per cohort, including master’s and doctoral degrees. France trains; another country recruits.
The phenomenon is concentrated among the best talent. Overall figures seem reassuring (fewer than 2 percent of French scientists leave for North America), but sectoral studies reveal a more concerning reality: in certain disciplines, 40 percent of leading French researchers are expatriated to the United States. These are Nobel Prize winners working elsewhere. Pierre Agostini and Anne L’Huillier, co-winners of the 2023 Nobel Prize in Physics, neither work in France.
The mechanism is straightforward. A university lecturer begins their career with a gross monthly salary of around 2,500 to 2,700 euros. A comparison conducted for the European Commission showed that a university lecturer received an entry gross annual salary representing 63 percent of the average entry salary of researchers in Europe and OECD countries. A researcher early in their career in Zurich, Munich, or Amsterdam earns two to three times more for equivalent work, in a system where the position arrives several years earlier. The question posed to the French doctorate holder is not abstract: staying or leaving is not an ideological choice, it is a calculation of lifetime income.
The tenure track: a good idea poorly calibrated
The 2020 Research Programming Law introduced junior professor positions, inspired by the American tenure track model. Official introduced in France through the 2020 Research Programming Law, this contract lasting three to six years aims to attract the best doctorate holders by offering them a position allowing them to become university professors more quickly, without having to go through several years of precarious postdoctoral work.
The assessment, five years later, is mixed. After three initial campaigns marked by a 82 percent fill rate, the attractiveness of these positions remains weak, with fewer than five candidates per position. Especially, the people recruited show an average age of around 38 years, six or seven years older than those entering tenure track in the United States. The mechanism reproduces in France the late entry age it was supposed to correct. 300 tenure track positions are opened in French universities each year according to the initial target of the Research Programming Law: but only 200 were opened in 2024.
The Research Programming Law promised 25 billion euros in additional spending over ten years for research. The amount proposed for 2025 falls short of the target by 136 million euros, that is 16 percent of the total target amount. The ministry’s departments indicated that, given this underexecution, priority would be given to implementing the allowance revaluation plan, if necessary by reducing programmed recruitments. In other words: to finance bonuses for researchers already in position, we recruit less. The revaluation of existing careers happens at the expense of renewal.
Changing who decides on career entry
The problem is not that there are not enough positions: the number has been rebounding since 2021. The problem is that the recruitment architecture structurally manufactures delay: the candidate waits for national qualification, then waits for a position to open, then waits to be ranked. At each stage, they chain precarious contracts. This system dates from the 1980s, when the number of positions was sufficient for the wait to remain short. It no longer is.
The break to put in place for 2027 is this: transfer to universities and research institutions the power to recruit directly on a pre-tenure contract, without prior national qualification, in exchange for an obligation to tenure following a period of international peer evaluation, and an entry salary indexed to the first quartile of comparable compensation in OECD countries. Acemoglu and Johnson, in their 2025 Nobel lecture, show that institutions that condition access to permanent positions durably shape who captures the gains from technological progress. A recruitment system that filters by seniority rather than by early merit concentrates scientific production among those who could afford to wait, that is, those best endowed in assets and networks.
This change transfers recruitment authority from the national commission to the institution, transforms qualification from a bureaucratic prerequisite into international peer evaluation at the time of tenure, and makes the right to competitive pay from entry enforceable. After this shift, the State no longer recruits through delayed national competition: it delegates the recruitment risk to institutions while giving them the means to assume it: and commits its responsibility to the level of entry compensation, not only to the number of positions opened.
Carl Benedikt Frey has shown that the concentration of recruitment around standardized pathways slows long-term innovation. France has built one of the most standardized academic pathways in the world at a time when its competitors are accelerating in precisely the opposite direction.
Sources
[1] MESR-SIES, “The state of scientific employment in France: Key indicators and benchmarks,” May 2025, https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2025-05/l-tat-de-l-emploi-scientifique-en-france-2025—indicateurs-phares-36860.pdf (accessed 21/11/2026).
[2] MESR-SIES, “The state of scientific employment in France: 2025 Report,” May 2025, https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2025-05/l-tat-de-l-emploi-scientifique-en-france—rapport-2025-36858.pdf (accessed 21/11/2026).
[3] MESR-SIES, “State of Higher Education, Research and Innovation in France no. 19: Qualification and recruitment of faculty,” 2025, https://publication.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/eesr/FR/T844/qualification_et_recrutement_des_enseignants_chercheurs/ (accessed 21/11/2026).
[4] Syntec Federation / Ipsos BVA, “2026 Barometer on expatriation and brain drain,” October 2026, https://www.syntec.fr/guerre-des-cerveaux-la-france-doit-se-relancer-dans-la-competition-mondiale/ (accessed 21/11/2026).
[5] DGRH / MESR, “DGRH Note no. 1: HR mechanisms of the Research Programming Law, years 2021-2022,” January 2024, https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2024-03/les-dispositifs-rh-de-la-loi-de-programmation-de-la-recherche-note-de-la-dgrh-n-1-janvier-2024-pdf-32235.pdf (accessed 21/11/2026).
[6] Philippe Aghion, “What AI Means for Growth and Jobs,” 2025, https://ideas.repec.org/e/pag175.html; and Aghion P. & Howitt P., Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press, 1998.
[7] Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, “Nobel Lecture: Institutions, Technology, and Prosperity,” American Economic Review, vol. 115, no. 6, 2025, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.115.6.1709.
[8] Carl Benedikt Frey, How Progress Ends: Technology, Innovation, and the Fate of Nations, Princeton University Press, 2025, https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691243627/how-progress-ends.
[9] Senate, special report “Draft Budget Law for 2025: Research and Higher Education,” November 2024, https://www.senat.fr/rap/l24-144-324/l24-144-32410.html (accessed 21/11/2026).
[10] Court of Auditors, “Analysis of 2024 Budget Execution: Research and Higher Education Mission,” April 2025, https://www.ccomptes.fr/sites/default/files/2025-04/NEB-2024-Recherche-enseignement-superieur.pdf (accessed 21/11/2026).
[11] MESR-SIES, “Professional integration one year after doctorate award in 2020: SIES Flash Note no. 2024-25,” September 2024, https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2024-09/nf-sies-2024-25-34686.pdf (accessed 21/11/2026).



