On July 27, 2025, Ursula von der Leyen flew to Trump’s golf course in Scotland. She returned with an agreement: the United States would cap its tariffs at 15 percent on most European products, but Europe would eliminate its own on all American industrial goods and commit to purchasing 750 billion dollars of American energy over three years [1]. What the agreement did not say: in the months before, the European Union possessed a commercial weapon capable of shifting the balance of power. It did not deploy it, and no one in European capitals really explained why.
Fifteen Percent Against Zero
The imbalance of Turnberry is documented. All economists and experts heard by Senate reporters agree that the Turnberry agreement, concluded on July 27, is fundamentally unbalanced: the European Commission agreed to eliminate tariffs on all American industrial goods. In return, Washington maintains 15 percent tariffs on European exports: an “all-inclusive” rate that in fact represents a net additional cost of roughly 10 percentage points since it absorbs the ordinary World Trade Organization tariffs already in effect [2].
The terms of the agreement leave a bitter taste: 15 percent tariffs on all goods imported from Europe against 0 percent for goods imported into Europe from the United States, purchases of liquefied natural gas totaling 750 billion dollars over three years, an investment of 600 billion dollars in the United States.
Nearly a year after the compromise sealed on July 27, 2025, the European Union’s assessment is therefore mixed. The agreement remains largely asymmetrical, as the European Parliament and EU businesses have repeatedly stated, but it has contributed to bringing stability to transatlantic trade relations. The Commission defends this record. Other observers see something else: the EU suspended its countermeasures during negotiations, giving the impression it wanted a deal at any cost—a basic strategic error. When you stop displaying your capacity to inflict harm, you deprive yourself of leverage.
The Weapon Left on the Shelf
Europe is not unarmed. Since December 27, 2023, it has had Regulation 2023/2675, known as the anti-coercion instrument: the ACI. Proposed in December 2021, adopted in November 2023, it aims to protect the Union and its member states against economic coercion exercised by third countries and provides a framework for action ranging from examination to the deployment of countermeasures. The real innovation of the ACI lies in its voting system: to impose commercial retaliation measures, the Commission needs only a qualified majority among member states, rather than the unanimous consent required for foreign policy measures.
Concretely, this means that Europe can strike without Hungary or another reluctant state being able to block it alone. This is precisely why the instrument was built. The Commission itself notes that the instrument “will be most effective if it does not need to be used,” signaling that the existence of a clear and credible response mechanism is meant to deter coercive behavior.
The problem is that the instrument has never been triggered. The debate over deploying the ACI intensified after Trump’s return to power. The EU nearly activated the instrument after the United States imposed high tariffs on the “liberation” day of April 2025, but Washington and Brussels ultimately resolved the dispute four months later via the Turnberry agreement.
Then came the Greenland crisis, in January 2026: Trump threatens an additional 10 percent tariffs on eight European countries that refuse to cede him the Danish territory. Emmanuel Macron calls for activation of the ACI in response to these threats linked to Europe’s opposition to the American project to acquire Greenland. A European diplomat confides: “This time, we would have the qualified majority necessary to trigger it.” The instrument stays on the shelf. The Turnberry agreement holds, in a state described by the Club of Lawyers as a commercial lull that remains legally and politically precarious.
Why the Bazooka Does Not Fire
The problem is not the qualified majority: the text provides for it. It is in the timelines and in political will. The ACI only sets indicative timelines: four months for Commission examination, six months for investigation of countermeasures. The schedules depend mainly on the dynamics of the Council and the engagement phase. These margins, theoretically designed to allow de-escalation, function in practice as so many exit ramps for states that prefer to negotiate rather than resist.
The involvement of an additional institution (which embodies 27 different positions) will considerably slow down the decision-making process. And member states must decide on a coordinated response against the United States: which is not guaranteed. The episode of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in October showed the reluctance of certain member states to defy great powers on sensitive subjects.
The French Senate report on the new state of international trade formulates it unambiguously: one can expect a measured response from member states, who are not inclined to trigger a tariff war by reactivating tariff retaliation measures on 93 billion euros of American exports suspended following the Turnberry agreement.
This is where Edward Fishman’s diagnosis takes hold. In Chokepoints (2025), he documents how the interdependence that created wealth has also created concentrated control points. Globalization has not abolished power dynamics; it has reorganized them.
Europe opened its markets for thirty years believing that prosperity would discipline rivalry. In doing so, it built dependencies without building the instruments to free itself from them. It has the bazooka, but not the doctrine to point it.
The most significant unintended consequence of the era of economic warfare is that it has undermined the foundations of the global economy. We are witnessing the emergence of a new world economic order, but unlike Bretton Woods (where great powers negotiated common rules and institutions), the new system is taking shape haphazardly, under the effect of unilateral acts of economic coercion. In that world, a weapon that is never raised is not a weapon: it is a signal of weakness.
What 2027 Must Change in the ACI’s Architecture
Bruegel, in its January 2026 note on the end of the Turnberry truce, formulates the choice precisely: responding to the American coercive threat must go beyond the reintroduction of measures adopted the previous year. Trump’s threats should be treated as coercion under the ACI framework: a step that formally requires a qualified majority in the EU Council. Activating the ACI would give the European Commission more power to respond to American threats.
The question posed to 2027 is not whether or not to activate such a package of countermeasures. It is to change who decides, how quickly, and according to what logic. Today, the Council must validate the existence of coercion before the Commission can act: validation that takes eight to ten weeks at best, and that is negotiated behind the scenes with the same states that balk at retaliation. A lack of political consensus among member states about the role of the EU’s supranational level in the link between trade and security shaped the ACI not only on the basis of external threats, but also of internal considerations about the distribution of competencies. The determination of economic coercion by the Council rather than by the Commission appears to be the result of a political compromise.
The architectural choice for 2027 is to transfer to the Commission the exclusive right to trigger the investigation phase and issue a provisional determination of coercion in less than six weeks, with the Council intervening only on appeal: with a blocking minority to be explicitly constituted, not a majority to be built. This inversion of the decision-making pattern changes who is active (the Commission) and who is passive (the states), and breaks the logic that prevailed at Turnberry: Europe no longer waits for its most reluctant members to give the green light for the adversary to understand that it can retaliate.
This is not a legal detail. It is the difference between a credible deterrent instrument and a well-drafted museum piece. After such a reform, any third state knowing that a commercial threat automatically triggers Commission investigation, with no veto right for capitals, recalculates its balance of power.
Sources
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[2] Confrontations Europe / Jean-Luc Demarty, “Turnberry Agreement: analysis and decryption,” Euradio / Confrontations.org, July-August 2025, https://confrontations.org/accord-de-turnberry-analyse-et-decryptage/ (accessed 30/09/2026).
[3] French Senate, “The new state of international trade,” information report no. 235, 2025-2026, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r25-235/r25-23523.html (accessed 30/09/2026).
[4] European Commission, Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 on the protection of the Union and its member states against economic coercion exercised by third countries (anti-coercion instrument, ACI), Official Journal of the EU, December 7, 2023, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/protecting-against-coercion_en (accessed 30/09/2026).
[5] Ignacio García Bercero (Bruegel), “The end of the Turnberry truce: how the EU should react to US coercion over Greenland,” Bruegel First Glance, January 20, 2026, https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/end-turnberry-truce-how-eu-should-react-us-coercion-over-greenland (accessed 30/09/2026).
[6] German Marshall Fund (GMF), “The EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument,” 2026, https://www.gmfus.org/news/eus-anti-coercion-instrument (accessed 30/09/2026).
[7] Houthoff, “The EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument: What businesses need to know about the ‘trade bazooka,’” 2026, https://www.houthoff.com/insights/news/the-eus-anti-coercion-instrument/ (accessed 30/09/2026).
[8] Euronews, “EU seeks Greenland de-escalation while plotting tariff retaliation against Trump,” January 19, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/19/eu-seeks-to-de-escalate-greenland-crisis-while-preparing-retaliation-on-trump-tariffs (accessed 30/09/2026).
[9] CELIS Institute, “The European Union’s Anti-Coercion Instrument: A Closer Look at Decision-Making under a Politicized Trade Instrument,” 2023, https://www.celis.institute/celis-blog/the-european-unions-anti-coercion-instrument-a-closer-look-at-decision-making-under-a-politicized-trade-instrument/ (accessed 30/09/2026).
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[13] Europe Agency, “Four things to know one year after the Turnberry agreement,” July 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/07/21/four-things-to-know-one-year-after-the-turnberry-agreement (accessed 30/09/2026).
[14] Club of Lawyers, “EU – United States: Does the Turnberry agreement really end the trade war?” July 2026, https://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/international/ue-etats-unis-laccord-de-turnberry-met-il-reellement-fin-a-la-guerre-commerciale-16616/ (accessed 30/09/2026).
[15] Edward Fishman, Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, Portfolio/Penguin, 2025: analysis via LSE Review of Books, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2025/06/26/book-review-chokepoints-how-the-global-economy-became-a-weapon-of-war-edward-fishman/ (accessed 30/09/2026).
[16] Robert Schuman Foundation, “From Turnberry to Mercosur: the European Union facing its moment of truth,” Foundation Letter no. 1139, January 2026, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/la-lettre/1139 (accessed 30/09/2026).
[17] National Assembly, information report on the extraterritoriality of American law, 2026, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L17B2844.html (accessed 30/09/2026).



