In six countries studied, Catholics represent 46% to 67% of adults and the nonreligious 12% to 33%, according to a Pew survey conducted in 2024 and published in January 2026. This decline is reshaping identities and affecting some of the mutual aid networks that originated from religious communities. Religious communities have played a support role in several societies where public services remain fragmented.

The essentials

  • In the six countries studied—the five most populous in Latin America and the Caribbean, plus Chile—Catholics now represent only between 46% and 67% of adults, and the nonreligious between 12% and 33%, according to the Pew Research Center (survey published in 2026).
  • The Catholic Church has played a role in organizing local protection in informal social safety nets in several contexts.
  • Challenges arise concerning the replacement of these functions by secular institutions and the expansion of social states.
  • Populations leaving these communities risk having fewer immediate local resources available to them.
  • The question of who organizes neighborhood solidarity in a Latin America that is aging and secularizing simultaneously remains open.

The Church as an unofficial safety net

To understand what is changing, we must first measure what existed. In working-class neighborhoods of São Paulo, Mexico City, or Bogotá, the parish was not merely a place of worship. The parish often provided mutual aid functions at the local level: material support, social ties, and the organization of collective rituals in several contexts.

These functions rested on dense physical presence. An active parish brings together roughly a hundred families who know one another, women who know who has not eaten that day, men who carry the coffin of a neighbor. This fabric is built over years of shared practice.

The available Pew data do not make it possible to determine whether the decline in attendance preceded the decline in stated belonging. Catholics who still identify as such but no longer attend weekly services benefit less from the network. The gradual disaffiliation of urban middle classes probably contributed to weakening parish communities before surveys measured the shift in identity.

Evangelicals have filled part of the void, but not in the same way

The decline of Catholicism is accompanied both by shifts toward Protestantism and, often more so, by religious disaffiliation. In the six countries, Protestants represent 9% to 29% of adults; one-fifth or fewer of adults in each country are Pentecostal Protestants. These churches captured some of the faithful leaving Catholicism and brought their own forms of mutual aid.

But the model differs. Evangelical communities are often smaller, more frequently attended, and more intensive in their demands for participation. They offer a real solidarity net, sometimes more effective than Catholic parishes on issues of addiction or domestic violence. They constitute an actor in informal social protection not to be overlooked.

The tension lies elsewhere. These churches do not cover everyone leaving Catholicism. The nonreligious, who represent up to one-third of the population in some countries according to Pew, constitute only a minority share of evangelical converts. Some people leave Catholicism and become religiously unaffiliated without the survey establishing their absence of other collective commitments. And evangelical churches, like Catholic parishes, operate on the basis of belonging: you are either in or out.

People without religious affiliation are not declared members of a religious community, but their actual access to confessional aid must be measured separately.

Latin American states have not built the secular equivalent

The history of Latin American welfare states is one of fragmented coverage. Social security systems were first built around formal workers, in economies where informal employment often represents between 40% and 60% of the workforce. Contributory programs for pensions and health insurance were largely tied to formal employment, while non-contributory assistance targets people not covered. In the region, nearly one worker in two is in informal employment, which limits their access to contributory schemes.

This architecture produced an effect documented by researchers in comparative social protection: religious institutions have filled, in several contexts, functions that the state covered elsewhere. This was not a historical accident but a stable equilibrium. In certain national contexts, governments relied on religious organizations for local-level management.

This equilibrium rested on a stability of religious belonging that the 2026 data calls into question. Conditional cash transfers like Bolsa Família in Brazil or Oportunidades in Mexico have extended formal coverage to poor households, but they structure solidarity links differently. A monthly transfer organizes things differently than community proximity: it does not structure funerals, does not replace visits to an elderly neighbor, and does not create the same support for finding work.

The accelerated aging of European societies shows how much states that have built public care institutions still struggle to cover proximity needs. Latin America is aging while contributory coverage and care systems remain insufficient in many countries.

What is missing when the parish empties

The social functions of religious communities can be grouped into three sets. The first is material: food aid, clothing, medicine, small tasks for elderly people. The second is relational: knowing who is isolated, maintaining regular contact, alerting when someone disappears from view. The third is symbolic: organizing the rites of passage that all human societies have produced—births, marriages, funerals—and that maintain the sense of belonging to a community larger than the nuclear family.

These three sets do not disappear together or at the same pace. Material aid can be substituted by secular associations or public services if resources are available. The relational link is much harder to organize formally: it requires field presence, knowing people by name, regular presence in living spaces. Rites of passage pose a different question: town halls offer civil ceremonies in increasing numbers, but they do not reproduce the community dimension that religious ceremonies activated.

Elderly people often depend on the proximity networks that these communities created. They often built their support networks through their religious community for decades. When attendance at these communities recedes in families, access to collective resources that these networks organized can be affected for some. In societies where urbanization has already broken village solidarities, the parish was sometimes the last space of organized proximity.

Who replaces, how, and at what scale

Several forms of substitution already exist, at very different stages of development. Neighborhood associations and social cooperatives have a long history in Latin America, particularly in Brazilian favelas and indigenous communities of Andean America. These secular structures sometimes perform functions identical to those of religious communities. But their coverage is geographically uneven: they are denser in areas where civil society had space to develop, that is, where secularization has often made least progress.

Digital mutual aid applications and social networks have created new forms of solidarity mobilization, visible in natural disasters. These coordination tools are real and effective in emergency situations. They do not reproduce the regular, unconditional, long-term presence that a living community maintains.

Two scenarios are emerging for the decades ahead, and signals that would allow us to distinguish them are beginning to become perceptible. In the first, versatile secular associations, supported by public funding and recognized fiscally in the same way as confessional organizations, take over mutual aid functions in areas of rapid secularization. This scenario presupposes a deliberate policy decision: mutual aid secular associations enjoy in several countries in the region different legal and tax frameworks than those benefiting religious organizations, which enjoy historically constructed statuses. Closing this gap would be a prerequisite for substitution.

In the second scenario, the social state remains structured around formal workers, civil associations do not have sufficient resources to operate at the parish scale, and people leaving religious communities find themselves without an organized proximity safety net. This scenario corresponds to the trajectory that some Latin American cities are following today: without visible dramatic rupture, but with silent accumulation of vulnerabilities.

The isolation of nonpracticing elderly people in working-class neighborhoods is not systematically documented by available social statistics. This gap in data is itself an obstacle.

The most useful signal to track would be the evolution of coverage of isolated elderly people by non-confessional services in areas of rapid secularization. This monitoring does not exist systematically in the region’s social statistics. The impact of secularization on informal forms of social protection is not systematically tracked by regional indicators.

Lessons from European secularization

Europe underwent massive secularization in two generations and produced secular institutions that partially took over the social functions of the Church. But this substitution occurred in very different contexts: welfare states already constituted, dominant formal economies, much higher income levels.

The European trajectory shows that secularization does not spontaneously dissolve the need for rites and proximity ties. Community centers, sports associations, parent-teacher clubs, and shared gardening groups have filled social functions that parishes once provided. These substitutes often benefited from public funding and legal frameworks that facilitated their development.

The question for Latin America is one of sequencing. Secularization is progressing in the six countries studied, while the state of substitute institutions is not established by this data. Regional social policies notably face the challenge of extending social protection and formalizing informal workers. These two agendas are technically distinct but socially linked. Precarious populations need both: a right to retirement AND a neighbor who knows you exist.

The perception of social protection issues plays its own role here. Latin American governments and public opinion tend to measure social protection by the standard of formal financial transfers. The informal mutual aid functions ensured by religious communities are not quantified in social budgets and remain invisible in coverage statistics. Their gradual disappearance risks being measured only long after it has produced its effects.

Community centers as prototype, not solution

Several Latin American municipalities are experimenting with versatile community centers that host mutual aid activities without requiring religious or ideological affiliation. These structures exist notably in Medellín, Montevideo, and Mexico City. Their development remains uneven, but they illustrate one possible prototype of secular substitution.

These experiments show that regular physical presence in a shared space, provided it is accessible and non-stigmatizing, can recreate functional proximity ties. Isolated elderly people who frequent these spaces regain a relational and material safety net partially comparable to what an active religious community would have provided them.

The main limit is budgetary and political. These centers require stable personnel, maintained facilities, and recurring funding. They cannot function on the volunteer basis alone that some religious communities mobilized through their collective dimension. The economic model presupposes a durable public decision, in countries where municipal budgets are often the first adjusted during fiscal constraints.

The recomposition is underway. It is not automatic and it is not assured. What is certain is that Latin American societies will age with levels of religious practice lower than those of their parents, while the question persists of who organizes proximity for isolated people.


Sources

  1. Pew Research Center, Religion in Latin America (survey published in 2026)
  2. World Values Survey / European Values Study, comparative waves on religious affiliations and practices (worldvaluessurvey.org)
  3. Pew Research Center, Religion in Latin America (reference report, 2014, for the long trajectory)
  4. Journal d’un Progressiste, Le vieillissement européen se paie déjà en carrières sacrifiées
  5. Journal d’un Progressiste, La perception déformée des Français oriente la politique sociale vers l’impasse