In 2019, severe drought struck Senegal. Through the African Risk Capacity mechanism, $23.1 million was disbursed, funding an anticipatory response, but distributions to households stretched over several months. What made the difference was not the speed of the payment—it was the existence of a distribution plan prepared well before the first rains failed. The Senegalese episode illustrates a truth that global climate finance takes far too long to understand: insurance protects only if the state already knows what to do with the money.

The essentials

  • The Sahel receives climate insurance payouts after droughts. Prior distribution plans can improve how payouts are used and strengthen protection for farming households.
  • In 2019, the African Risk Capacity disbursed $23.1 million to Senegal to finance an anticipatory response to drought. ARC estimated that at least 975,000 people would be affected by the drought (OECD, Scaling Finance and Investment for Climate Adaptation, 2025).
  • The mechanism relies on parametric triggering: payment activates automatically when rainfall drops below a defined threshold, without waiting for field assessments.
  • Adaptation financing remains massively insufficient at the regional scale, and ARC requires an emergency plan approved as a condition of insurance eligibility, with a final implementation plan required if payment is made, though strengthening these requirements remains possible.
  • The open question for the decade is whether Sahelian states can build, before 2030, the social registries and payment systems capable of making parametric insurance a real safety net for agriculture.

Where the funds go

A Sahelian drought follows a schedule that economists call “the spiral of assets.” When rains fail, families wait first. Then they sell a goat, then the herd, then the seeds. Each sale makes the next season more fragile. When aid arrives after these liquidations, it compensates for a loss but does not restore the means of production.

Family farming has already taken a step backward.

The ARC Agency, a specialized agency of the African Union created in 2012, and ARC Ltd, its insurance and risk transfer affiliate created in 2014, was precisely designed to break this spiral. Its principle is parametric: payments do not depend on a slow and costly field assessment, but on an automatic trigger based on satellite precipitation data. When rainfall drops below a threshold defined in the contract, the money goes out. The funds reached beneficiary institutions in December 2019, but their deployment to households stretched through 2020.

But the delay between triggering and the arrival of funds in the hands of rural households remains the real bottleneck. The absence of an up-to-date social registry, mobile payment circuits, or identified local agents can slow the distribution of funds to remote areas. Remote areas, precisely those where families are most exposed, wait longer for it. The speed of the mechanism’s payment, its distinctive quality, then loses much of its value.

Lessons from the Senegalese episode

The OECD presents the case as an illustration of the advantages of parametric insurance and national emergency planning. Among the factors that favored a better response in Senegal was the prior existence of a response plan: an operational document specifying priority beneficiaries, circuits, and local officials responsible. A prior operational plan was required by ARC as a condition of insurance eligibility.

This upstream preparation transforms the nature of the tool. Without it, there is a greater risk that the payment will not be quickly converted into household assistance. With it, parametric insurance can be aligned with shock-responsive social protection systems. The distinction has direct consequences: in the first case, the poorest households risk liquidating their assets before receiving assistance; in the second, assistance can be disbursed more quickly and reduce reliance on negative strategies.

The OECD notes the need for institutional strengthening and a global deficit in adaptation financing. Financing insurance premiums can appear less complex than financing the annual update of a social registry or training field agents. Administrative and distribution capacities remain unequal and insufficiently developed in some contexts.

Sharing the transition’s additional cost

American economist Daniel Yergin, in an analysis published by Foreign Affairs, argues that the “energy transition” amounts to addition: renewable energy accumulates on top of fossil fuels instead of replacing them, and this process generates massive additional costs whose distribution remains unresolved. This distribution question takes on particular significance in the Sahel.

Sahelian countries rank among the world’s lowest greenhouse gas emitters, but they rank among the regions where warming progresses fastest. The frequency and intensity of droughts are increasing. Family farmers, who feed most of the rural population, absorb this climate cost without having caused any part of it. The question of how to share the cost of adaptation is therefore not only a question of climate justice: it is a question of economic efficiency. A household that liquidates its herd in 2024 to survive a drought is a household that cannot plant in 2025.

Agricultural desertification ultimately costs far more than the insurance premium.

Dani Rodrik, an economist specializing in conditions for equitable globalization, formulates a question complementary to Yergin’s: do international financial mechanisms actually create local jobs and capacities, or do they merely manage crises? Applied to African climate insurance, this question points to the same gap: an emergency payment that arrives after productive assets are lost manages destitution without protecting production. The short-term humanitarian horizon and the long-term agricultural horizon are distinct, and this distinction should govern the design of mechanisms, not merely their financing.

Social registries, the invisible infrastructure of resilience

A well-documented weakness of climate insurance systems in sub-Saharan Africa lies in the nonexistence or obsolescence of social registries that would allow states to know, before crisis strikes, whom to help first. Under-financing in premiums is a separate and secondary problem.

An up-to-date social registry is a database identifying vulnerable households, their precise location, their means of subsistence, their available payment circuits. Some Sahelian countries lack up-to-date social registries, or possess data only from the last census. When drought strikes, the administration starts from scratch. It identifies beneficiaries after the shock, which takes weeks. Households have already sold.

The German BMZ, which co-finances the ARC Replica program allowing humanitarian actors to complement the ARC coverage of governments, identified this gap as a priority. But financing the annual update of a registry requires a recurring budget commitment, less visible than an insurance premium and politically less attractive to donors. The result is a system where the financial tool and administrative mechanisms already exist, but their quality and speed of deployment vary by country. The question of financing invisible institutional infrastructure, as opposed to visible expenditures, arises in other domains with equal urgency.

One possible reform would be to require that distribution plans not only be approved, but regularly tested and updated before coverage activation. ARC already imposes prior planning, but strengthening these requirements could improve the mechanism.

Two trajectories for Sahelian family farming through 2035

Drought and water stress risks should increase with warming, but projections specific to the Sahel remain uncertain depending on the metric and scenario. Family farming, which employs the vast majority of rural workers in the region, will have to contend with increasingly unpredictable seasons. The question for the 2030-2050 period is whether anticipatory financing mechanisms can effectively maintain this farming in productive condition, or whether repeated shocks will cause a progressive collapse of rural productive capacities.

Two trajectories emerge from available forward-looking analyses. In the first, each Sahelian state has, before the rainy season, a validated and tested operational plan: up-to-date registries, mobile payment circuits functioning to remote areas, identified local officials. Assistance can be disbursed more quickly and reduce reliance on negative strategies. Family farming can absorb the shock with less loss of productive assets. Over ten years, resilience accumulates.

In the second trajectory, funds arrive but the distributing administration is deficient. Assistance reaches remote areas unevenly. Households have already liquidated livestock and stocks. Insurance reduces losses without restoring productive assets.

Each episode leaves family farming a little more fragile. Repeated droughts accumulate asset losses, which can contribute to migration trends from rural zones.

The quality of administrative systems and the level of financing count among several determinants of crisis response. Two signals would allow measuring the direction taken: the average time between payout triggering and receipt by identified households, and the share of targeted households that receive aid before selling their productive assets. These measures do not yet exist systematically. Building them would already be progress.

Underfunded positions among climate donors

Adaptation financing is insufficient and below needs, without being nonexistent or nearly wholly displaced in favor of mitigation. Yet for a Sahelian country, adaptation is the urgency. The distinction matters because it determines what gets financed.

A solar panel or a decarbonized gas plant enters donor climate accounting. An annually updated social registry, mobile payment agents trained in remote areas, a weather information system linked to insurance triggers: all of this enters existing budget lines with difficulty. The OECD identifies a general deficit in adaptation financing and obstacles to financing capacities and public investments.

Yergin is right about the additional cost question: someone must pay the difference between a world that has emitted and a world that burns. The logic prevailing in wealthy countries’ industrial financing—financing what is visible, not what truly protects—appears here at a scale with direct human consequences. In the western Sahel, warming should increase drought risks, particularly their frequency and duration at high warming levels, strengthening the need for adaptation investments that their economies struggled to finance alone. Parametric insurance can quickly trigger funds once a predefined climate threshold is reached to finance an early response. But its effectiveness depends on administrative investments that current financing architectures insufficiently fund.

One possible reform is technical before it is political: strengthen, test, and regularly update distribution plans before coverage activation, beyond the planning ARC already requires. This prerequisite does not cost much. It changes everything about what you are buying.


Sources

  1. OECD, Scaling Finance and Investment for Climate Adaptation (2025), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/07/scaling-finance-and-investment-for-climate-adaptation_be6892fb/eeec8b52-en.pdf
  2. BMZ, ARC Replica, https://www.bmz.de/en/issues/climate-change-and-development/climate-risk-insurance/arc-and-arc-replica-59528
  3. Daniel Yergin, Peter Orszag, Pavan Sukhdev Arya, The Troubled Energy Transition: How to Find a Pragmatic Path Forward, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/troubled-energy-transition-yergin-orszag-arya