A quarter of high school teachers in France are 55 or older. In France, 1.9% of fully qualified primary and secondary public school teachers left the profession in the reference year. According to the OECD, the annual exit rate of fully qualified primary and secondary teachers combined reaches 1.9% in France, compared to 6.4% on average in countries and economies with available data. French schools appear stable; in reality, they are preparing for an increase in departures that current recruitment efforts may not be sufficient to absorb.
The essentials
- In France, 23% of secondary school teachers are 55 or older, nearly four times the equivalent share among employed workers with a master’s degree (6%).
- The annual exit rate of fully qualified primary and secondary teachers combined reaches 1.9% in France, compared to 6.4% on average in the OECD for primary and secondary combined, a gap reflecting a profession one enters to stay in until retirement (OECD, Education at a Glance 2026).
- The apparent stability masks a deferred risk: when retirements from the 55-and-older cohort accelerate, the recruitment system will need to absorb a larger influx, while recruitment and training measures have already been set in motion.
- The real territorial risk is that vacant positions concentrate in the least attractive schools, widening already-documented gaps between school districts.
- Expanded recruitment pathways and geographic retention bonuses exist as levers, but their deployment determines France’s ability to avoid the shortages that other OECD countries have experienced.
An aging teaching workforce that standard figures don’t reveal
These two figures measure the same thing: the share of those 55 and older in two distinct populations. In secondary education, this share reaches 23%; among employed workers with a master’s degree, it is 6%. Secondary school teachers are therefore nearly four times more represented in this age group than their peers with comparable qualifications on the French labor market.
This gap says something structural. Teachers enter the profession after a selective competition, settle in, and do not leave before the legal retirement age. Workers with a master’s degree in the private sector change employers, retrain, leave their sector for another. Mobility there is normal and frequent. In public education, it is virtually nonexistent: one enters the profession to have a full career there.
The annual exit rate of 1.9% confirms this picture. Out of every hundred fully qualified primary and secondary teachers combined, roughly two leave the profession each year in France. In OECD countries and economies with available data, the average rate is 6.4% for primary and secondary combined. The gap is massive. France’s low exit rate is accompanied by departures mainly related to retirement, without establishing that teachers enter the profession intending to stay there until then.
This gap can notably be influenced by age structure, the labor market, and professional culture, according to the OECD, as well as by the nature of the professional contract that France has built around public education.
This stability has real virtues. It produces experienced teachers who know their schools and students over time. It reduces rotation costs. It is also, in part, the product of a professional culture where one defines oneself as a teacher, not as an employee in a sector.
But it has a downside. A profession that almost never loses its members recrusts only at minimum flow. And when the cohort of 55-and-older begins to leave more, the recruitment system must scale up, in a candidate market unprepared for it. Retirement departures will increase replacement needs, but the net effect on recruitment will also depend on changes in student enrollments and staffing policies.
The deferred shortage: how current calm prepares the crisis
The rate of 1.9% creates an illusion of comfort. Positions are filled, classes have teachers, competitions produce each year a number of successful candidates corresponding to usual departures. Everything is working for now.
When this cohort leaves more, the pace of departures will increase. Such concentrated aging of the teaching workforce calls for careful monitoring of departure trends.
The problem is that teacher recruitment systems cannot be recalibrated in a matter of months. Training a teacher takes time—a MEEF master’s degree (master’s in teaching, education and training professions), a competition, a year of probation. Broadening the pool of candidates takes even more time, because it requires changing perceptions of the profession, its salary conditions, and access routes.
Other OECD countries have lived through this sequence. Some have faced sudden shortages of qualified teachers, forced to open classes to contractors without full training, to leave positions vacant for several weeks at the start of the school year, or to concentrate remaining candidates in the most attractive schools. France is not there yet. But its current exit rate of 1.9% must be interpreted alongside age structure and other determinants of departures.
The article published here on primary school without teachers already documented the concrete effects of a teacher shortage on students and families. Secondary education is not yet in this situation, but the demographic structure of its teaching workforce brings it closer faster than is perceived in current public debate.
The OECD comparison and policy choices
The annual exit rate of 6.4% in OECD countries represents an average that covers very different realities. Some countries have high teacher mobility because their employment conditions are less protective, because contractors are numerous there, or because the qualified labor market is more fluid. France has chosen a tenured civil servant model: maximum protection, minimum mobility.
This choice is coherent: recruiting in unattractive areas is difficult. A tenured teacher in a rural area or priority neighborhood remains in post because status provides security. Weakening that status to increase mobility would have an immediate cost: already-poorly-sought positions would be even less filled. But the stability of the exit rate masks another problem: competitions attract a variable number of candidates depending on disciplines and academic regions.
In recent sessions, some secondary-level positions have remained unfilled, particularly in certain disciplines, without this demonstrating direct causality with declining applications. The weakness of the current exit rate gives the impression that the system is balanced. It conceals that the pool is shrinking at the very moment when the wave of forthcoming departures will require it to be larger.
The OECD comparison also points to a French singularity in age structure. In many member countries, those 55 and older represent a much smaller share of the teaching workforce, because systems recruit more continuously, with more regular flows of exits and entries. France presents a significant concentration of older teachers, partly linked to variations in recruitment needs according to cycles of school demographics. These recruitment jolts are directly readable in the current age pyramid.
The territorial risk: fragile territories at the end of the line
When positions open faster than candidates arrive, they don’t open uniformly. Schools in city centers, in attractive academic regions, in generalist disciplines find candidates. Others wait.
This logic is already visible in current recruitment difficulties. Certain tight disciplines—mathematics, physics and chemistry, rare languages—encounter supply difficulties. Territorial difficulties are documented in some academic regions, notably Créteil, Versailles, French Guiana, and Mayotte for the competition in question. An acceleration in departures could amplify this phenomenon.
The mechanism is simple. An experienced teacher retiring opens a position. If a candidate applies, they choose their assignment in competition order or by seniority. The most attractive schools go first. Less attractive schools receive remaining candidates or contractors when positions are not filled through competition.
For students in these territories, the effect is direct and documented. Pedagogical continuity decreases when teachers change frequently or are less trained; shortages of education staff are associated with poorer school results, particularly in mathematics, without establishing causality on their own. Families with necessary mobility then send their children elsewhere, which concentrates difficulties in already-fragile schools. OECD work on school inequality and French research on university access by territory converge on this point: the phenomenon occurs in a context of documented territorial gaps, without its aggravating effect being established.
Anticipate before departures accelerate
Two scenarios are emerging for the coming years, depending on the choices France makes now.
In the first, retirements accelerate without the recruitment system having been expanded. France risks facing position-filling difficulties similar to those encountered by other OECD countries. The signals that would announce this trajectory are readable: an annual exit rate that suddenly rises in upcoming editions of Education at a Glance, and a growing share of unfilled positions at school start in tension-affected academic regions.
In the second scenario, France anticipates. It expands pathways into the profession: accelerated career transitions for workers with a master’s degree in tight disciplines, with progressive tenure and school-based support. It creates mechanisms for geographic retention, bonuses for teachers settling in less attractive territories. It adjusts the number of positions open in competitions according to medium-term projections of needs.
These levers exist in other OECD countries. Some have created lateral entry routes into teaching for professionals in career transition, with variable but documented results. Others have experimented with geographic retention bonuses with sufficient success to maintain teaching supply in isolated areas. France has begun to consider accelerated career transition mechanisms, but their deployment remains limited. An increasing number of recruitment and training measures have already been set in motion, but their reach remains to be monitored.
The signal to monitor is precise: each annual edition of the OECD’s Education at a Glance publishes teachers’ exit rate by country. If this rate begins to rise in France, it will be the sign that departures are accelerating. The moment to act is now, when the rate is still at 1.9% and room for maneuver exists. Waiting for the number to rise is choosing to manage the crisis rather than avoid it.
The concrete effects of expanded recruitment
Expanding pathways into the profession does not mean lowering teacher standards. Well-functioning systems in the OECD combine solid initial training with diversified access routes: standard competition, career transition from the private sector, alternating contracts at the end of a master’s program, progressive tenure after several years as a trained contractor.
Recruitment relies mainly on competitions but includes several access routes and recourse to contractor teachers. This model produces well-trained teachers. It also excludes profiles that would have disciplinary competencies—an engineer in mathematics, a biologist, a historian employed in the private sector—but who cannot or do not wish to sacrifice two or three years to formal retraining before being paid normally.
An accelerated career transition, with school-based support in the first years and progressive tenure over four or five years, would allow capturing these profiles. It would partially solve the problem of tight disciplines, where competitions already struggle to fill positions. And it would broaden the pool without degrading quality: an experienced engineer teaching mathematics with pedagogical support is not worse than a successful competition candidate who has only ever worked in higher education.
The question of salary attractiveness remains open. It exceeds the scope of this article, but it conditions both scenarios: an insufficiently paid profession will attract fewer candidates in career transition, even if access routes are open. OECD data on teacher salaries in France show a gap compared to the average of member countries at comparable experience levels, a gap that recent revaluations have begun to partially correct without eliminating it entirely.
The age structure of the teaching workforce leaves room for action. The exit rate of 1.9% must be interpreted alongside age structure and other determinants of departures. The coming years will determine whether the recruitment system will be able to respond to an acceleration of departures.



