In 2025, the degradation of tropical humid forests declined by a third globally. Africa followed the opposite trend. The Forest Declaration Assessment 2026 documents this divergence: while the global indicator fell by 34%, the degradation of African tropical forests increased by 25%. These two dynamics bear the same name but obey distinct mechanisms, and policies designed for one do not protect against the other.
The essentials
- The degradation of tropical humid forests fell by 34% globally in 2025, but it rose by 25% in tropical Africa (Forest Declaration Assessment 2026).
- The gap is explained by the nature of the pressures: the documented decline is notably linked to strengthened law enforcement in Brazil; traceability and corporate commitments are described as emerging factors; in tropical Africa, the increase is attributed to small-scale agriculture, informal exploitation, and governance gaps.
- Measurement tools track several forms of pressure and degradation, with coverage limitations specific to each indicator, which affects the detection of African dynamics.
- Degradation often precedes permanent forest conversion: if local communities do not receive economic incentive to protect degraded forests, conversion to permanent agriculture could accelerate.
- Payment mechanisms for environmental services adapted to informal agriculture, without formal land title requirements, are among the approaches being explored to break this dynamic.
The global balance masks a continental fracture
The commitments made in Glasgow in 2021 to end deforestation by 2030 have produced measurable results in several regions. The Brazilian Amazon, after years of increase under the Bolsonaro administration, began a clear decline from 2023 under Lula’s policy drive. Indonesia and Malaysia have reduced their deforestation linked to palm oil, partly thanks to traceability requirements imposed by European buyers. These advances are real. They drive the global indicator.
But they also create an optical effect. When an aggregated indicator falls by 34%, it is tempting to read a general trend into it. The Forest Declaration Assessment 2026 refuses this reading. It documents in detail the African divergence: a 25% increase in the tropical humid forests of the continent, at the very moment when the rest of the world is posting its best results in years.
Hannah Ritchie, in her work on climate pessimism, recommends reading regional data before accepting the aggregated narrative. She argues that anxiety-inducing climate journalism under-reports real progress, at the risk of discouraging action. Applied to the Forest Declaration Assessment 2026, this same empirical rigor reveals a deterioration masked by a flattering global balance.
Informal agriculture: a pressure that current policies do not capture
Industrial deforestation is visible from space. Large agricultural operations, mining projects, roads carved into primary forest leave clear satellite signatures. Policies that have worked in Brazil and Southeast Asia target these actors: traceability obligations, exclusion from export supply chains, investor pressure.
Small-scale informal agriculture operates differently. A farmer who opens a few hectares on the forest edge to plant cassava, corn, or coffee leaves a fragmented, diffuse footprint, invisible in indicators designed to detect large-scale logging. This type of pressure is structural in central and western Africa. Population densities are rising rapidly in rural areas where economic alternatives are limited, land rights are informal, and social safety nets are almost nonexistent.
The report signals divergent regional trends and certain measurement limitations, without explicitly stating this inadequacy. The indicators combine several drivers of forest loss, including shifting agriculture and permanent agriculture. They underestimate degradation from subsistence farming. This bias can direct climate financing and forest protection programs toward zones where indicators are clearest.
Degradation, an issue as grave as deforestation
Forest degradation is less spectacular than deforestation. A degraded forest still exists. It still appears in inventories. But it has lost part of its canopy density, its biodiversity, its capacity to store carbon and regulate hydrological cycles. And above all, it is far more vulnerable to permanent conversion.
The mechanism is documented: a forest degraded by repeated timber extraction, by shifting cultivation, or by clearing fires loses its resilience. It recovers less well after each disturbance. It attracts more permanent clearance, because it seems already compromised in the eyes of neighboring communities. Degradation precedes deforestation; it is often the first step.
Urban tree cover has entered French legal obligations, and this legislative movement illustrates how the value of forests, even fragmented, even degraded, is progressively recognized as a common good that must be protected before disappearance, not after. In tropical Africa, this recognition arrives more slowly, and degraded forests remain outside formal protections.
The quantified stake is considerable. The African continent holds about 25% of the world’s tropical forests. The Congo Basin is the second-largest tropical forest massif on the planet, after the Amazon. A sustained 25% increase in degradation in this zone is not a marginal signal.
Carbon markets facing the realities of African communities
Carbon forest markets, and in particular mechanisms for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (the program known as REDD+), have been presented for two decades as the solution for paying countries and communities that protect their forests. The balance is mixed.
REDD+ projects have worked overall better in contexts of industrial deforestation, with formal actors, clear land titles, and traceable export flows. In central and western Africa, forest communities often practice agriculture without recognized land title, in spaces with unclear legal status between public domain and customary use. These communities face structural obstacles to accessing most existing mechanisms, which assume land rights and formal frameworks they do not possess.
The result is double exclusion. These communities suffer the effects of climate change—droughts, disruption of agricultural seasons—while their access to climate financing remains insufficient and unequal. Their agricultural practices, responding to local economic constraints, exert pressure on forest resources.
Dani Rodrik, whose work on “good jobs” and industrial policy for the poorest populations illuminates such situations, insists on a principle that forest policies have often neglected: an incentive mechanism that does not articulate with local economic realities will not change behaviors, regardless of its financial sophistication. The Forest Declaration Assessment 2026 extends this intuition by showing that it remains to build a system for paying forest protection that is accessible to a farmer without formal land title, earning an annual income of a few hundred dollars.
Adapting instruments or missing the 2030 window
The international objective of ending deforestation by 2030 demands a significant acceleration of action. But it rests on a condition that the 2025 balance reveals clearly: current instruments offer unequal protection to African forests. And African forests represent too large a share of the world’s carbon and biodiversity stocks for this blind spot to remain ignored.
Two trajectories are taking shape for the 2026-2035 period, depending on the policy response to this inadequacy.
In the first scenario, detection tools and remuneration mechanisms are adapted to small-scale informal agriculture. Satellite indicators capable of distinguishing degradation from subsistence agriculture from industrial deforestation make it possible to measure the problem with precision. Payments for environmental services accessible without land title, on the model of certain pilot programs in Kenya and Uganda, offer forest communities a credible economic alternative. In this scenario, the 25% increase documented in 2025 triggers a proportionate response, and the curve reverses before degraded forests tip toward permanent conversion.
In the second scenario, global indicators continue to measure what they know how to measure, and forest policies continue to fund what they know how to fund. The improvement in the global degradation indicator in 2025 mostly reflects the end of the 2024 fire peak. African degradation advances according to the report as a result of small-scale agriculture, informal exploitation, and governance gaps. Forests in the Congo Basin could enter the 2030s with a level of cumulative degradation harder to restore.
Distorted data perception often orients public policies toward solutions that address measurable problems, not real problems. The measurement bias described by the Forest Declaration Assessment 2026 follows exactly this logic: what is not counted is not protected.
The signals to watch are precise. The annual evolution of the degradation rate in tropical Africa, measured by an indicator distinct from the global indicator, will tell whether the divergence documented in 2025 is a peak or the start of a trend. The number of African communities benefiting from a remuneration mechanism for protecting degraded forests will measure whether financial instruments have begun to adapt. These two signals, taken together, will make it possible to know which trajectory we find ourselves on by 2027-2028, early enough to correct course before 2030, not after.
Building tools for what exists, not for what we measure well
The lesson from the Forest Declaration Assessment 2026 goes beyond the question of African forests. It touches on a structural limit of global environmental policies: their tendency to fund and protect where indicators are clearest, and not where pressures are strongest.
Industrial deforestation is a political and economic problem solvable by political and economic instruments. Corporate commitments, traceability obligations, and financing exclusions have produced measurable results, and these instruments deserve to be strengthened. They do not, however, address the situation of tropical Africa: protecting forests degraded by millions of individual survival decisions, made by communities without access to formal markets, requires different tools.
The answer will not be the same. It will pass through detection systems adapted to the spatial fragmentation of informal agriculture, through payment mechanisms designed for customary land rights, through agricultural alternative programs that increase yields without extending cleared areas. These instruments exist in pilot form. The Forest Declaration Assessment 2026 provides the empirical argument to scale them: the window remains open, but it will not remain so indefinitely.



