South India watches YouTube, shares memes, listens to television differently. Three researchers spent years observing what these uses construct politically. Their conclusion unsettles the usual certainties about algorithmic power: publics do not simply allow themselves to be manufactured.

The essentials

  • Digital platforms frame uses without determining them: creators, linguistic communities and local formats retain a capacity for invention that the algorithm only partially controls.
  • The inquiry covers three sites in South India: Tamil satire on YouTube, activist meme cultures and sonic experiments on television.
  • Language is a political infrastructure: defending Tamil or Telugu on a global platform means defending a capacity to form autonomous publics.
  • Minority popular cultures must contend with an attention economy dominated by a few recommendation architectures.

Who are the authors

Aswin Punathambekar teaches communication studies at the University of Pennsylvania. His previous research focused on Indian media industries, particularly Bollywood as an economic and cultural system. Sangeet Kumar, professor at Denison University, works on digital media and popular cultures in South Asia. Sriram Mohan, researcher at the University of Surrey, explores intersections between politics, visual culture and digital space in the Indian context. Together, they represent a generation of scholars trained between India and Anglophone universities, capable of reading global platforms without losing sight of the local logics that inhabit them.

A Mobile Popular is their first collective work, published by NYU Press in January 2026. The academic debate on platforms then opposed the thesis of algorithmic all-powerfulness to that of user agency. The authors reject both positions and propose a third way.

The thesis: the mobile as a space for political formation

The title plays on a productive ambiguity. Mobile designates both the phone, the dominant medium for cultural consumption in India, and mobilization, in the political sense. The work argues that the two are linked: precisely because popular culture circulates on mobile, new political publics become possible.

The central thesis can be formulated as follows: platforms create conditions, not publics. What people do with these conditions depends on their languages, inherited formats, traditions of satire or community solidarity. YouTube’s recommendation architecture optimizes engagement; it does not decide what Tamil can say to power.

This position directly opposes two well-established academic traditions. The first, inherited from platform studies, treats platforms as quasi-autonomous agents that shape behavior through their interfaces and incentives. The second, derived from fan studies and cultural studies, celebrates users’ creative resistance at the risk of forgetting real constraints. Punathambekar, Kumar and Mohan propose a third way: to look at what happens in the intermediate space, where constraints and inventions are negotiated concretely.

First site: Tamil satire on YouTube

Political satire in the Tamil language has a long history, rooted in popular theater, activist press and cinema. On YouTube, this tradition finds new life. The authors follow several creators who have built audiences of several hundred thousand subscribers by producing political commentary in Tamil, often in the form of sketches, parodies of official speeches or video montages.

These creators navigate a double constraint. YouTube rewards consistency and engagement: you must publish often, keep viewers on the platform, optimize thumbnails and titles for the algorithm.

Yet effective political satire demands time, subtlety and deep knowledge of local context that the algorithm cannot measure.

The most-followed Tamil creators have found accommodations. They produce two types of content in parallel: short formats easy to share, calibrated for recommendation, and long formats that do the real political work. The first finances the second. This economy of content is not merely an adaptation to the platform: it is a deliberate editorial strategy, inherited in part from practices of Tamil activist press from the previous century.

The authors show that language plays a structuring role here. Tamil is not merely a vector of communication: it is a marker of belonging and a space of trust. A viewer watching satire in Tamil knows they share with the creator a culture of reference that the algorithm cannot simulate in Hindi or English. This linguistic solidarity creates a loyalty that engagement metrics capture poorly.

Second site: activist meme cultures

The chapter on memes is perhaps the most original in the work. The authors focus on communities that produce and circulate political memes in South Indian regional languages, particularly during the 2024 legislative elections.

The political meme in a regional language constitutes a genre in its own right, with its codes, internal references, circuits of validation and implicit rules. Understanding a Tamil political meme requires knowing the history of the Dravidian movement, rivalries between regional parties and canonical figures of local popular satire. This cultural competence functions as a natural filter: it excludes those who do not share the context.

This exclusivity cuts both ways. It protects communities against algorithmic invasion by outside content, but it can also lock them into inward-looking spaces, where satire loses its capacity to surprise or convince. The authors document this tension without resolving it.

What is more original in their analysis is the attention paid to intermediaries. Between the meme creator and their audience stand WhatsApp group administrators, Facebook page curators, Instagram accounts that select and redistribute. These invisible actors have real influence over what circulates. The authors call them “gatekeepers from below,” as opposed to institutional gatekeepers like editorial boards or platform moderators. Their power is informal, local, often voluntary, and almost entirely ignored by platform research.

This observation meets broader concerns about the concentration of gains in the attention economy. A few large platforms capture most of the value produced by millions of local creators. The “gatekeepers from below” described by the authors work for free to enrich infrastructures they do not control. A book review devoted to Cultural History of AI by Alexandre Gefen raised a comparable issue for literary creation: who profits from the circulation of works in AI systems.

Third site: sonic experiments on television

The most unexpected chapter concerns television, a medium many consider already a relic of the last century. The authors show that in South India, regional television has undergone a significant transformation of its sonic uses to adapt to mobile consumption.

The argument is subtle. The book includes chapters on political uses of sound, nationalist influencers and sonic art. Program hosts, jingles, the prosody of presenters have evolved to allow listening in conditions of mobility: in transit, at work, while cooking. This evolution is not an impoverishment of the medium: it is an adaptation that allows it to survive and remain politically relevant in a context where attention is fragmented.

The authors see in it a form of media hybridization that standard convergence models do not capture well. Regional television no longer competes with YouTube on the same ground: it occupies a different space, that of sonic company, the political backdrop that accompanies the day. And in this space, regional languages have a structural advantage over content produced for a national or international audience.

Blind spots

Several limitations deserve to be named.

The first limitation is geographic. South India is heterogeneous: Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu exceeded the national literacy average in 2011, unlike Andhra Pradesh. Its regional political traditions and history of linguistic movements distinguish it from other contexts. The conclusions about the resistance of local popular cultures to algorithmic logics probably apply less well to regions less endowed with cultural and political capital. The authors do not address this point.

The second limitation is temporal. The inquiry covers primarily the period 2020-2024. Platforms evolve quickly. YouTube’s recommendation logics in 2026 are not those of 2022. The stability of the phenomena described remains to be verified.

The third limitation concerns the absence of systematic quantitative data. The work is resolutely qualitative, which allows it to engage with the subtlety of uses but exposes it to questions of representativeness. The creators followed may be typical or exceptional. The authors privilege depth over breadth, leaving entirely open the question of scale.

Finally, the thesis about the political capacity of popular cultures remains largely descriptive. The authors show that these cultures can form autonomous political publics. They say little about the conditions that make this capacity realized rather than dissolved into pure entertainment. The distinction between a Tamil community of cinema fans and a politically mobilized Tamil community remains fuzzy.

Reasons to read it

A Mobile Popular addresses first scholars in media studies and political science working on non-Western democracies. But its questions extend well beyond this circle.

Anyone interested in cultural diversity in the digital economy will find a solid analytical framework. UNESCO has for years worried about the concentration of global cultural industries and their effects on diversity of expressions. The authors show, in a specific case, how minority cultures resist this pressure and what resources they draw on. The answer they give is less romantic than that of user agency advocates: resistance passes through infrastructures, particularly linguistic and communal ones, that demand active maintenance. It does not go without saying.

For the French reader, the book offers a useful mirror. French regional cultures wage their own battles against algorithmic recommendation logics. Creators in Occitan, Breton or Alsatian face challenges structurally similar to those described by Punathambekar, Kumar and Mohan. The terrain differs, the stakes of political mobilization differ too, but the substance remains: a popular culture must preserve its capacity to form publics capable of thinking together.

The question exceeds the cultural frame alone. Insofar as these publics are also electorates, deliberating communities, groups capable of resistance or mobilization, it touches on the health of democracies themselves. On this register, connection with Contra el descontento by Cristina Monge imposes itself: the two works, from very different angles, pose the same question about the conditions of possibility for a coherent political public in the digital age.

The work is in English, dense, rooted in the Anglophone academic debates of platform studies and cultural studies. It demands effort in reading. But it rewards this effort with an analysis that reduces none of its objects: neither the platforms, too powerful to be ignored but not all-powerful; nor the creators, real but constrained; nor the publics, active but not free.


Bibliographic information

Title: A Mobile Popular: Media Entertainment and the Political in Digital India Authors: Aswin Punathambekar, Sangeet Kumar and Sriram Mohan Publisher: NYU Press Date of publication: January 2026 Available in open access: NYU Open Square


Sources

  1. NYU Press, A Mobile Popular: Media Entertainment and the Political in Digital India
  2. NYU Open Square, open access version
  3. UNESCO, Re|Shaping Policies for Creativity, 2022, unesco.org/en/reshaping-creativity-reports